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Chapter 12.

Autobahn (U)

51. (S) Initial Arrangements

(S) The use of the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn as a supply and transportation route for the U.S. Army elements in Berlin was based on oral agreements with the Soviet authorities reached at a series of conferences held on 29 June 1945.¹ At that time the Soviet and American representatives agreed that Halle would serve as a staging area for U.S. forces earmarked to move to Berlin and that for the first four days of the move these forces would use the Halle-Berlin road. Thereafter the United States and British forces were to use the Helmstedt-Magdeburg-Berlin Autobahn only, with the stipulation that the Autobahn would neither be theirs exclusively nor be considered a corridor.²

(U) These arrangements were modified the next day when the Soviets agreed, at the United States' request, to extend the deadline on the use of the Halle-Berlin road until 7 July, after which all traffic was to go through Magdeburg. In addition to serving as a staging area, Magdeburg would then be used as a transloading point from rail to road until Soviet forces completed the construction of the railway bridge over the Elbe River so that direct train service to Berlin could be resumed.³

¹A Survey of Soviet Aims, Policies, and Tactics, cited above, pp. 136-7. SECRET. Gp-1.

²Berlin District/First Airborne Army, History and Report of Operations, 8 May - 31 Dec 45, Part II, pp. 2-4. UNCLAS.

³EUCOM Hist Div, International Aspects of the Occupation, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES 1945-1946, pp. 120-1. UNCLAS.

52. (S) Truck Shuttle Service

(U) During the summer of 1945 regular long distance motor freight runs were inaugurated between Berlin and the various U.S. installations in the Bremen Enclave and the U.S. Zone. Since the rail facilities could not be used until late July, complete reliance was placed on long distance motor freight hauling to supply the U.S. garrison in Berlin. Helmstedt, rather than Magdeburg, was selected as the starting point for the line of communications truck hauls. Convoys began to operate on this route on 23 June.⁴

(S) The first U.S. convoy passing over the Autobahn to Berlin was held up at Magdeburg for 48 hours. During the following days, it became obvious that the congestion was caused not only by the inadequacy of facilities, arising partly from the zeal of the Soviet authorities in making sure of reparations, but also by halts and interruptions imposed by local Soviet commanders, sometimes for inexplicable reasons. Although the Soviet authorities had guaranteed U.S. and British convoys the unhindered use of the Autobahn, they did not adhere to their premises. To reduce the innumerable delays at Soviet check points, U.S. transportation officials and interpreters preceded convoys to check points, often without success.

(S) Another difficulty that arose during this early period was that organized bands of Soviet soldiers and deserters stopped Allied vehicles on the Autobahn and robbed them of Army supplies and the personal property of their occupants. In August 1945, therefore, armed cars were assigned to accompany all U.S. supply convoys.⁵

(U) After 27 July, when the rail service to Berlin was reestablished, the use of truck transportation was gradually reduced. Thereafter, trucks were used mainly for shipping priority cargo to Berlin and for moving personnel. Moreover, since freight trains making the 110-mile run between Helmstedt and Berlin frequently took as long as two or even three days to complete what was scheduled as a 9-hour trip, truck transport remained the standard means of moving personnel to and from Berlin for more than two months after regular rail freight service had been established.

(U) By the end of September the railways had assumed nearly all of the burden of delivering supplies to Berlin. Thereafter long distance motor freight operations were confined almost entirely to the dispatch of

⁴(1) Historical Report of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater, Vol VII, Part 1, p. 11. (2) History of 11th Traffic Regulating Group (TC), 1945, p. 41. Both UNCLAS.

⁵A Survey of Soviet Aims, Policies, and Tactics, cited above, p. 137.
SECRET. Gp-1.

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occasional trucks to carry priority cargo.⁶

53. (S) Establishment of Procedures

a. (U) Clearance for Entry into the Soviet Zone. On 27 July 1945 the first steps were taken to establish policies and procedures whereby U.S. military personnel on official business might enter the Soviet Zone. The Soviet refusal to admit such personnel had been detrimental to the conduct of military operations and to the proper administration of justice. For example, the proceedings of several general courts martial were being delayed pending attendance by complainants and civilian witnesses who resided in the Soviet Zone.⁷

To provide the required service, the Allied Control Council established a visitor's bureau, together with the necessary machinery to handle expeditiously all interzonal travel requests of military personnel.

b. (S) U.S. Request for a Second Access Road. In November 1945 the U.S. authorities in Berlin renewed their demand for a second access road across the Soviet Zone. The Hof-Leipzig-Berlin route was proposed, since it would be little more than half as long, for traffic originating in the Munich-Nuernberg area, as the authorized route through Kassel-Braunschweig-Helmstedt. The U.S. forces were ready to accept any route leading directly from Hof to Berlin if it had a minimum overhead clearance of 14 feet.⁸ No facilities such as rest halts and refueling points would be required.

⁶(1) Historical Report of the Transportation Corps in the European Theater, Vol VIII, Part II, Sec VI, pp. 110-4. Figures on supply deliveries by truck to Berlin are not available. In view of the absence of organized line-of-communications trucking operations elsewhere in Germany, however, it is believed that shipments to Berlin accounted for the bulk of the approximately 180-ton daily average of freight moved on this type of haul in all of Germany during September. See GCMZ, Progress Report, Sep 45, "Occupation Area Supplement." p. 41. (2) EUCOM Hist Div, Transportation, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, 1945-1946, pp. 130-1. Both UNCLAS.

⁷(1) Ltr, USFET to CG, US Gp Control Council (Germany), 27 Jul 45, Subj: Clearance for Entry into the Soviet Occupied Zone. AG 092 GAP-AGO. (2) 1st Ind, US Gp Control Council, (Germany), 17 Aug 45. AG 210.482-1. (3) International Aspects, cited above, pp. 175-6. All UNCLAS.

⁸IRS, USFET G-4 to AG, 5 Nov 45. MOV/JCC/Ext. 2-2012. SECRET. No Gp.



This request, like similar previous efforts, was ignored by the Soviets.

c. (U) U.S. Facilities Along the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn. At the beginning of 1946 U.S. headquarters in Berlin designated the Autobahn from Helmstedt to Berlin as the only authorized road for the use of U.S. forces entering the Berlin District. A traffic control point was established at Helmstedt, where personnel moving to Berlin had to present their travel orders and obtain passes for crossing the Soviet check point. Another U.S. military police check point was established at the entrance to Berlin.

Effective 3 January 1946, the U.S. authorities in Berlin closed the Autobahn, from 1800 to 0600 hours, to all U.S. vehicles and personnel except convoys of three or more vehicles and single vehicles carrying high-ranking officers, important civilian personnel, couriers, or personnel on emergency missions. An advance notice of 48 hours was required for convoys. The new instructions also specified that the facilities at Helmstedt were to include billets for 12 officers and 8 females.⁹


d. (U) Soviet Check Point Procedures. Allied travelers arriving at the Soviet check points at either end of the Autobahn submitted documents establishing their status as members of the Forces—travel orders or laissez-passer with a Russian translation—plus an identity card bearing a photograph. Normally there was no examination of vehicles, cargo or baggage. Germans with identity documents and interzonal passes could cross the interzonal boundary. Until 1948 the Soviets raised no difficulties when Germans with valid documentation traveled in vehicles carrying at least one member of the Allied Forces. Cargo-carrying vehicles driven by Germans from the Western Zones were authorized to proceed through the Soviet Zone if their documentation was issued by the appropriate military government office.¹⁰

e. (U) Interzonal Travel Regulations. An Interzonal Facilities Bureau, made up of representatives of the four Allied powers, was created on 13 September 1946. It dealt with interzonal travel, formalities in regard to the movements of diplomatic representatives and military missions, and requests from Germans for travel permits.¹¹

⁹Cable DHCD-446, Berlin Dist to USFET Main et al., 5 Jan 46. UNCLAS.

¹⁰(1) Annex 14 to Rpt, 25 Sep 53, cited above. CONF. (2) EUCOM Hist Div, The Third Year, 1 Jan-31 Mar 48, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, VOL I, p. 59. UNCLAS.

¹¹Control Council Directive No. 36, 13 Sep 46. UNCLAS.



In general, the four-power machinery functioned with relative smoothness from mid-1945 until early 1948. Occasional incidents came to be accepted as a part of the normalcy during this period.¹²

54. (S) Other Events Preceding the Blockade

(U) On 1 April 1948 the U.S. representative at the Helmstedt check point reported that the Soviet authorities were permitting only military personnel with proper orders to pass through and were refusing to allow civilian travelers--both Allied and German--to pass without a "Russian visa."¹³ A few days later the Soviets established a new requirement, demanding that outgoing cargo be submitted for their prior approval and that stamped passes be obtained from the Soviet Kommandatura. As a result, Allied supply trucks returned to the Western Zones empty.¹⁴

(U) The Soviets thus tightened the blockade gradually, imposing new restrictions and often relaxing them soon after they had been imposed. The Autobahn was repeatedly blocked and traffic stopped until "repairs" could be accomplished. For several days vehicles were forced to make a long detour along a poor dirt road and cross the Elbe by hand ferry, two at a time. Moreover, both the United States and the United Kingdom were asked to withdraw their communications and service personnel stationed along the Autobahn. In May new border searches were imposed on German travelers and freight between Berlin and West Germany on the ground that they were necessary to prevent looting. The over-all effect was that Berlin's links with the West were severed gradually.¹⁵

(S) Following the announcement of the currency reform in the three Western zones on 18 June 1948, the Soviets ordered severe border control measures, allegedly to halt the flow of old currency into their zone. One of these measures was to halt all vehicular traffic across the east-west border. The blockade had begun.¹⁶

¹²Edgar McInnis, Richard Hiscocks, and Robert Spencer, The Shaping of Post War Germany (New York, 1960), p. 111. UNCLAS.

¹³Berlin Airlift Chronology. In USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec files. UNCLAS.

¹⁴New York Herald Tribune (Eur ed), 12 Apr 48. UNCLAS.

¹⁵(1) McInnis, cited above, p. 118. (2) Davison, cited above, p. 65. (3) Howley, cited above, p. 193. All UNCLAS.

¹⁶EUCOM Hist Div, The Third Year, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 48, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, Vol II, p. 43. SECRET. Gp-1.



55. (S) Post Blockade Harassment

To end the blockade, the four military governors issued orders restoring the transportation, trade, and communications services between East and West on 12 May 1949. On that day an estimated 1,500 trucks and passenger cars entered Berlin.¹⁷ In the following years, however, the Soviets imposed a series of temporary restrictions and made all kinds of threats that appeared to be parts of an over-all effort to intimidate the West Berliners and wear down their resistance. East-West truck traffic suffered from hindrances that were inflicted and then removed, often without explanation or apparent reason. In early July 1949, for instance, the Soviet authorities in East Germany closed down all the principal border-crossing points for Berlin-bound highway traffic except the Helmstedt entry point. After representations by the three Western Commandants in Berlin, these restrictions were lifted.¹⁸ In February 1950 the Soviets held up trucks moving scrap metal from West Berlin to West Germany; in September 1951 they imposed a heavy road tax on all vehicles, licensed in West Berlin and West Germany, that used the Autobahn or other roads in the Soviet Zone; and in May 1952 they closed a number of crossing points between West Berlin and the Soviet Zone and Sector to prevent "spies, terrorists, and diversionists" from entering Soviet-occupied territory.¹⁹ In 1953 they applied increasing economic pressure on the Allied authorities and the German population of West Berlin. Heavily armed Soviet patrols and East German police parties frequently encroached upon the access routes to West Berlin and interfered with the flow of traffic at border crossings.²⁰


By October 1953 the weekly military convoy that traveled on the Autobahn between Berlin and Helmstedt had been subjected to several incidents that seemed to be planned for the purpose of forcing the Western Powers to recognize the East German regime. The East German police, for instance, deliberately slowed down vehicles that were not violating speed limits. They also attempted to prevent convoys from making normal stops

¹⁷ EUCOM Ann Narr Rept, 1949, p. 33. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 38-9. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁹ Post War Berlin: An Unofficial Chronology, U.S.I.S., Berlin. Jan 59. UNCLAS.

²⁰ (1) Cable SMC IN 1803, HICOG, Bonn, 4 Mar 53. SECRET. (2) Cables 129-33, USBER to HICOG, Bonn, 26 and 28 Mar and 1 Apr 53. All in USAREUR SGS 094 Berlin (1953). Vol I, Items 24, 26, and attached papers. CONF. No Gp.



for lunch or coffee. On 29 April 1954 a Soviet officer gave added emphasis to this point when he informed a U.S. convoy commander that halts on the Autobahn were not permitted. In early June 1954 East German policemen, riding on motorcycles, attempted to control the speed of a convoy and threatened the soldiers in the convoy with pistols. A few weeks later they repeated their attempts to slow down a convoy and actually fired a shot at the lead vehicle, without causing damage.²¹

East German efforts to achieve recognition were intensified in May 1955 when the Federal Republic of Germany was granted its sovereignty. Almost immediately the East German regime increased the tolls assessed on West German vehicles using the Autobahn from Helmstedt to Berlin. While not directly related to U.S. access to Berlin, this increase in toll charges was bound to affect the economy of West Berlin, for which the Allies had assumed responsibility.²²

On 7 June 1955 all road signs in English were removed along the Autobahn from Helmstedt to Berlin. These signs had been put up in July 1945 and had been maintained by the U.S. Army. The East German authorities now asserted that their "sovereignty" over East Germany entitled them to take this step.²³

In early November 1956, simultaneously with their demand to check train passengers against the lists submitted to them, the Soviets demanded to see all identification cards of personnel traveling in military convoys. Two weeks later these demands were expanded to include a physical inspection of the interior of the vehicles and a line-up of the troops in order to identify documents with faces. Since these demands were considered unacceptable, CINCUSAREUR ordered military convoys to be discontinued as of 9 December 1956.²⁴ During the following months, and until the new forms of travel documentation were quadripartitely agreed to, the two principal issues in the sphere of Autobahn access were the showing of enlisted men's identification cards and the documentation of cargo carried by convoys.²⁵

²¹Berlin Comd Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 73-5. SECRET. No Gp.

²²USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1955, pp. 339-40. SECRET. Gp-1.

²³Berlin Comd Hist Rept, FY 1955, p. 72. SECRET. No Gp.

²⁴Berlin Comd Hist Rept, FY 1957, p. 89. SECRET. No Gp.

²⁵Background Paper, 28 May 1960, subj: Inspection of Military Convoys. In USBER file 341. CONF.



56. (C) The Issue of Identification Procedures in 1957

Documentation procedures for road movements differed among the Allies. The British and French, for instance, never refused to show Soviet control personnel the identity cards of all travelers. However, these procedures were of minor significance as precedents, because the British rarely transported personnel by truck and the French never sent convoys to Berlin.²⁶

Annoyed by the Soviet insistence on the showing of enlisted men's identification cards, CINCUSAREUR proposed to force the Soviet authorities' hand by notifying them that a military convoy would come to the Berlin check point and informing them that the U.S. officer in command would identify himself and certify that the convoy was on an official mission. If the Soviets refused to clear the convoy without inspecting the identification cards of the enlisted men, the convoy would return to Berlin, where a factual press release would be made. This procedure would be repeated daily until the Soviets finally cleared the convoy.²⁷ The French and British turned down this proposal, fearing that such action would only provoke the Soviets into a more profound review of the access issue and lead to further difficulties.²⁸ USAREUR maintained that an organized truck convoy was a military unit and therefore not subject to internal scrutiny by the Soviets. The maximum documentation to which the Soviet check point officials were entitled would consist of being shown the officers' identity cards, a Russian translation of the travel orders, and a manifest listing the number and type of vehicles as well as the number of officers and enlisted men.

The procedure proposed by the United States was tested in early August 1957, when an infantry unit of the U.S. garrison in Berlin moved to a training area in West Germany. The Soviets again refused clearance to the advance party unless each individual could be checked against the photograph on his identity card. The convoy returned to its point of origin, but two days later another convoy was cleared through the check point without a demand that individuals be matched with their identity cards. USAREUR was determined not to retreat on this issue, since assent

²⁶ Cables 86 and 93, USBER to AMEMB, Bonn, 16 Jan and 1 Feb 57. Both CONF.

²⁷(1) Cable SX-1189, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 12 Jan 57. (2) Cable SX-1375, CINCUSAREUR to AMEMB, Bonn, 23 Jan 57. (3) USAREUR CAD Jnl, Jan 57. All CONF. No Gp.

²⁸ Cable 288, AMEMB, Bonn to Dept of State, 19 Jan 57. CONF.

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to Soviet demands to match identity cards with individuals would set a precedent that might lead to Soviet personnel insisting upon boarding military trains to check the passengers.²⁹

Since a showdown with the Soviets over the single issue of identification procedures was to be avoided, convoy movement over the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn was held to the minimum considered essential for military operations. Requests for the use of truck convoys through the Soviet Zone had to be approved by USAREUR headquarters. No restrictions, however, were imposed on military trucks passing through the Soviet Zone individually.³⁰

57. (S) Documentation of Cargo

a. (C) Change in the Documentation of Individual Military Vehicles.
In April 1958 the Soviet political adviser in Berlin raised the issue of cargo documentation of Allied trucks, insisting that every truck should carry a document specifying the type and quantity of the cargo. He insisted that the Allies issue documentation certifying that shipments were in fact military, in order to prevent possible abuses by military personnel.³¹


Until then the documentation carried by individual U.S. Government vehicles traveling on the Autobahn had been a trip ticket that did not indicate the nature of the cargo carried. Military vehicles traveling in convoy carried a vehicle manifest showing the vehicle number, the type of vehicle, a description of the cargo in general terms, and its weight. These manifests had been used by Autobahn convoys at least as far back as 1951, and were shown to Soviet check point officials upon request.³² While considering it unacceptable to go beyond specifying the general nature of the vehicle cargo, USCOB recommended that the documentation procedures for individual cargo vehicles be brought into line with the long-standing convoy documentation practices. USAREUR

²⁹(1) Cable SX-5118, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 10 Aug 57. (2) Cable SX-5371, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 22 Aug 57. Both CONF. No Gp.

³⁰(1) Cable SX-5371, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 22 Aug 57. (2) Cable SX-6559, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE; Berlin Comd et al., 22 Oct 57. Both CONF. No Gp.

³¹Cable 262, USBER to AMEMB, Bonn, 11 Apr 58. CONF.

³²DF, USAREUR CAD to CofS, 21 Apr 58, subj: Military Vehicle Cargo Documentation on the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn. AEACA. CONF. No Gp.



approved this recommendation and issued orders to that effect. If individual military vehicles carried no cargo, this fact was to be indicated on the manifest.³³

b. (C) CINCUSAREUR's Position. At the beginning of May 1958 General H.I. Hodes, then CINCUSAREUR, stated that Allied military vehicles traveling the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn should not be required to show documentation at Soviet check points. If Soviet clearance at check points could not be secured without documentation, presentation of a document that did not go beyond the use of the term "military supplies and equipment" for the description of the cargo would be permissible. Such a document could be used for individual vehicles or convoys. There would be no objection to Soviet stamping of this document, since the stamping would be analogous to the punching of a train ticket.³⁴

On 22 May General Hodes received General of the Army Zakharov, his Soviet counterpart, at Heidelberg. General Hodes explained that the U.S. garrison in Berlin had to be supplied and that the troops had to be taken out of Berlin periodically so that they could train in West Germany. Under existing agreements these supply and troop movements were supposed to take place without interference. General Zakharov's predecessor had understood these needs and had agreed with General Hodes on these principles. The harassment procedures used by Soviet check point officials were unnecessary and unacceptable. There was no need for convoy movement orders listing the name and identification car number of each soldier or details concerning the cargo on each truck. General Zakharov agreed and stated that for troop or cargo movements the U.S. officer in charge should present documentation showing that he, together with a certain number of troops, was going to proceed from check point to check point. This documentation, which should be stamped to show that the convoy had passed through the check point, should suffice if the convoy commander was questioned en route. For movements of supplies only the number and kinds of vehicles and a definition of the types of supplies would be needed. When General Hodes interjected that he saw no reason for listing the types of supplies, General Zakharov promised to investigate the procedures.³⁵

³³(1) Cable COB-58, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR; AMEMB, Bonn, 24 Apr 58. (2) DF, USAREUR CAD to CofS, 25 Apr 58, subj: Berlin Access. AEACA. Both CONF. No Gp.

³⁴Memo for Rec, C/CAD, 2 May 58, subj: Documentation of Military Trucks and Convoys Traveling the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn. CONF. No Gp.

³⁵Cable SX-4099, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 23 May 58. CONF. No Gp.

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c. (S) The Soviet Reaction. (C) The results of this investigation proved to be surprising. In a meeting of political advisers on 18 June 1958, during which convoy documentation was discussed, the Soviet representative claimed that General Hodes, in his conversation with General Zakharov of 22 May, had agreed that the Soviets had the right to control the movement of vehicles and personnel. The record of that conversation, however, indicated that the inspection issue had not been discussed.³⁶

(C) To clarify the situation, USAREUR decided to send a convoy from Berlin to Helmstedt. The Soviet Commandant in Berlin was notified of this intention and informed by letter that the convoy commander would be in possession of documentation prepared in accordance with the Hodes-Zakharov discussion. In reply General Zakharov stated that this documentation would not suffice, because the four political advisers had not reached agreement on Autobahn control procedures. On 23 June, when the convoy appeared at the check point, the Soviet officer in charge refused to clear it without additional documentation, and the convoy returned to its point of origin. This probe ended with an official USAREUR protest.³⁷

(C) Seven days later the Soviets were presented with a tripartite proposal on military truck documentation and a copy of the recommended cargo manifest form. Again it turned out that the Soviets did not interpret the Hodes-Zakharov discussions in the same way as did USAREUR. The Soviet Commandant rejected the Allied proposal to list cargo under the headings of military supplies and equipment, suggesting instead a breakdown into armaments, foodstuffs, and other equipment, together with a statement of the total weight and number of containers. In addition, he insisted that Soviet check point personnel had the right to look at the contents of the vehicles, so as to ascertain that the contents complied with the manifest. He added that this procedure was not to be considered as a customs-type inspection.³⁸

(S) During the following months tripartite, and later quadripartite, discussions led to the development and introduction of convoy movement orders that served as documentation for military convoys and individual vehicles.³⁹

³⁶Background paper, 28 May 60, cited above. CONF. No Gp.

³⁷(1) Ltr, Berlin Comd to USAREUR, 4 Jun 58, subj: Convoy Movements. AEACA. (2) USAREUR CAD Jnl, Jun 58. Both CONF. No Gp.

³⁸USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 305-7. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

³⁹Draft, U.S. Army, Berlin, Hist Rept, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 62, p. 62. SECRET. Gp-1.



58. (C) Instructions for Military Convoys and Individual Vehicles

a. Movement Orders. Before his departure, each convoy commander was issued a single copy of the movement order, prepared in English and Russian. The order, completed by the Autobahn operations officer, indicated the name of the convoy commander, the number of officers, the number of enlisted men, the number of vehicles, and the type of cargo. This order and the officer's identification card were the only documents he was authorized to present to Soviet officials. Under no circumstances was he to show any documents to East German officials.

b. Travel through the Soviet Zone. Military truck convoys were not to deviate from the prescribed route or exceed the speed limit of 40 miles an hour. Time limits were prescribed for the trip. If less than the minimum was required, the person in charge would be issued a notice of traffic violation. If travel was not completed within the maximum time allowed, a search would be initiated. Stopping on the Autobahn was not permitted except for stops caused by competent traffic control measures. Stopping off the Autobahn for a break was authorized, but only in the parking areas. No photographs were to be taken and no hitchhikers were to be picked up. In case of a breakdown, slips issued to the convoy commander before entry into the Soviet Zone were to be used to notify the military police at Helmstedt or Berlin so that a wrecker could be dispatched.

c. Individual Vehicles. Single military trucks were processed in the same manner as a military convoy, and single military sedans were processed like privately owned vehicles.⁴⁰ The requirements for clearance and documentation for travel to and from Berlin were spelled out in another USAREUR Circular.⁴¹

59. (U) Privately Owned Vehicles

The documentation of personnel traveling the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn in automobiles bearing USAREUR or U.S. diplomatic license plates consisted of movement orders issued by USAREUR, USCOB or the U.S. Embassy in Bonn. The categories of persons authorized to receive movement orders for Autobahn travel to and from Berlin were identical with those traveling by U.S. military train. Persons with East German visas or travel permits were not allowed to travel in USAREUR-registered

⁴⁰USAREUR Cir 550-182, 23 Jan 61, subj: Access to Berlin (U). CONF. No Gp.

⁴¹USAREUR Cir 550-180, 26 Feb 60, subj: Clearance and Documentation for Travel to and from Berlin. UNCLAS.

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vehicles bearing U.S. Army license plates. To avoid incidents and to ascertain that travelers understood their responsibilities, personnel on duty at the U.S. check points were to brief all travelers and to issue to the individual in charge of each vehicle a copy of the special instructions governing travel through the Soviet Zone.⁴²

60. (S) Inspection of Vehicles


(U) In 1958, following the introduction of the new convoy movement order, the Soviets attempted to assert their right to inspect the contents of Allied trucks. On 14 November a truck was detained for about six hours because the driver refused to let Soviet personnel inspect the interior of his vehicle. The demand was refused, the truck returned to Berlin, and for several days closed U.S. and U.K. trucks were dispatched. Some of these succeeded in getting through; others were turned back. Since quadripartite discussions on the subject of inspection remained inconclusive, the United States decided to dispatch only open trucks and vans. This procedure involved having a door open on a radio van, the rear canvas rolled up on cargo trucks, or some part of the vehicle open, to enable Soviet check point personnel to see inside without stepping off the ground.

(S) The Soviets sporadically demanded close inspection of vehicles to look for unauthorized Germans or to verify cargo lists. Occasional attempts to climb up on the rear of a vehicle to obtain a close look were frustrated by pulling would-be Soviet inspectors off. However, except for one incident in February 1959, in which a convoy was held for 54 hours⁴³ before being cleared without close inspection, the Soviets did not appear to be interested in making the inspection of vehicles a major issue.

(S) In contrast to U.S. procedures, it was the practice of the British, whose lorries have higher tailgates than U.S. trucks, to lower tailgates while at Soviet check points. They justified this concession by pointing out that the configuration of their vehicles is such that a raised tailgate would invite controversy over mounting the trucks, a procedure

⁴²(1) Change 3, 26 Apr 56, subj: Operation of Privately Owned Vehicles in Germany, to USAREUR Cir 643-30, 7 Sep 55, same subject. (2) USAREUR Cir 550-180, cited above. Both UNCLAS.

⁴³"Note from the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Protesting Detection of a United States Army Convoy, February 4, 1959," in Documents on Germany, cited above, p. 412-3. UNCLAS.



they also did not permit.⁴⁴

61. (S) Movement of a Reinforced Battle Group in One Day

After the East German regime had sealed off the sector border by constructing the "wall", President John F. Kennedy decided to reinforce the U.S. garrison in Berlin. A Seventh Army battle group, reinforced by one towed 105-mm howitzer battery and one combat engineer company, was alerted to move by administrative motor convoy via the Autobahn, with departure from the Helmstedt check point scheduled for the morning of 20 August 1961 and arrival at Berlin in the afternoon of the same day. The objective of augmenting the U.S. garrison was to demonstrate the United States' attitude in the Berlin situation, not to probe Soviet intentions. However, the U.S. force was to be prepared to react to Soviet or East German harassment and opposition.

The column cleared the Helmstedt check point in 7½ hours and the Berlin check point in 7 hours and 50 minutes. East German policemen were stationed about 250 yards apart on both sides of the Autobahn, apparently to keep East German civilians from observing the convoy, as well as to prevent incidents. Between Helmstedt and Berlin USAREUR established nine check points from which reports on the progress of the column were dispatched. The movement involved 1,500 officers and men and their equipment, loaded in 491 vehicles and trailers.⁴⁵

62. (S) Dismounting and Headcount

(S) After the introduction of new convoy documentation in 1958, the Soviets verified the numbers of officers and men shown on the movement order by making a personnel count. Although there was no legal basis for such a verification, the practice became established and was not seriously objected to by the Western Allies. On a number of occasions Allied convoy commanders ordered their troops to dismount in order to expedite the counting process.⁴⁶

⁴⁴(1) Rept of Visit of CINUSAREUR to CINCSFG, 21 Jun 62, p. 96. In USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec files. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-3. (2) Draft, U.S. Army, Berlin, Hist Rept, cited above, pp. 62-3. SECRET. Gp-1.

⁴⁵USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 34-7. TS (info used SECRET). Gp-3.

⁴⁶Draft, U.S. Army, Berlin, Hist Rept, cited above, pp. 63-4. SECRET. Gp-1.

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(C) It was not until August 1961 that dismounting and the headcount became a problem, because in general U.S. personnel did not dismount and the Soviets did not demand it. However, during the processing of the first serial of the reinforced battle group, sent to Berlin on the 20th of that month, two counts resulted in errors when the personnel remained mounted, and the battle group commander insisted that his men dismount for the counting. At that time the Soviets reluctantly submitted to his demands.

(C) Subsequent serials followed similar procedures, and the practice was continued in other later convoy movements whenever large numbers of personnel were involved. While there was no established U.S. policy, and each convoy movement or series of movements such as a battle group rotation was treated on a case-by-case basis, convoy commanders were authorized to dismount their troops when such action facilitated processing.

(C) The Soviets, capitalizing on a precedent established by the United States' own making, varied their demands concerning dismounting. For example, on occasion they demanded that the personnel of a supply convoy dismount, even though only a driver and an assistant driver were on each vehicle. In such instances the U.S. personnel refused to dismount; the Soviets never insisted to the point of reaching an impasse.⁴⁷

(C) Since Allied practices with respect to dismounting and headcount procedures varied, it was considered desirable to eliminate differences in order to present a unified position in the face of Soviet harassment. In the past it had not been British practice to have soldiers dismount for headcounts. However, the British were willing to comply with requests for dismounting, provided that a British officer ordered the troops to dismount and decided how and where they were to form for the headcount. No photographs of British troops would be taken nor would they be exposed to Soviet or East German propaganda leaflets or broadcasts. In bad weather, British officers would decide whether or not troops would dismount.⁴⁸

(S) USAREUR's general philosophy was to accept, without making major concessions, reasonable demands of the Soviets that expedited the processing of convoys through check points and that did not subject U.S. personnel to undue discomfort, indignities or degrading harassment.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Rept of Visit of CINCUSAREUR to CINCGSFG, cited above, p. 95.
SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-3.

⁴⁸Cable 1066, USBER to CINCUSAREUR et al., 23 Mar 62. CONF.

⁴⁹Cable SX-3771, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB/CG USAB; AMEMB, Bonn, 4 Jun 62.
SECRET. Gp-3.

[REDACTED]

However, one of the most important considerations in establishing unilateral and tripartite procedures for dismounting and headcounts was the possibility that the control of Autobahn movements might be transferred from Soviet to East German check point personnel at a future date.⁵⁰

63. (S) Advance Notification

a. A Time-Saving Device. In occasional early instances American transportation officials and interpreters gave the Soviet authorities advance notification of U.S. military convoy movements over the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn. The Soviets, however, expressed no interest in obtaining advance information on convoy movements and the measure had little success in speeding up check point procedures.⁵¹


In late 1956, when excessive check point delays began to occur more frequently, the commander of a U.S. convoy moving from Helmstedt to Berlin preceded his vehicles to the Soviet check point by 15 minutes, to present his documentation and to inform the Soviets that his unit was approaching. The evident success of this attempt to expedite check point processing led to the custom of volunteering oral advance notice for several convoys during the months that followed. Twice during December 1956, for instance, commanders or their assistants preceded their convoys to Soviet check points; in one case the Soviet headquarters at Karlshorst was notified approximately 24 hours in advance.

b. Other Precedents. In March 1957 CINCUSAREUR directed that the commander of a specific convoy precede the unit to the Soviet check point, to announce its impending arrival and also its composition. In addition, Berlin Command was authorized to notify the Soviets of the convoy "several days" in advance if he thought such notice to be desirable. A month later, however, the U.S. Embassy, Bonn, expressed its opposition to advance notifications unless they had normally been given in the past. Nevertheless the procedure was repeated at various times, on the ground that in certain cases—those involving unusually large convoys or awkward vehicles and equipment—advance notification would be beneficial to U.S. interests in that the convoys would be processed more rapidly. Advance announcements were made in some verbal form at least 4 times during the remainder of 1957.

Not until 1958 was the notification of a U.S. convoy made in writing. In a letter dated 20 June the Berlin Provost Marshal informed Soviet head-

⁵⁰Cable 1223, USBER to CINCUSAREUR et al., 26 May 62. SECRET.

⁵¹A Survey of Soviet Aims, Policies, and Tactics, cited above, p. 137. SECRET. Gp-1.



quarters at Karlshorst that a convoy would proceed through the Soviet check point three days later. However, this procedure was not continued.⁵²

c. Establishment of a policy. A general policy on advance notification was established in February 1959 when CINCUSAREUR directed that the Soviets be so notified when "unusually large" items of equipment were to be moved over the Autobahn. Advance notice was to be given to officials at the operational level and "only for traffic control purposes."⁵³ Two weeks later the Berlin Provost Marshal informed the Soviet check point officials at Babelsberg that a truck and a bulldozer would be leaving Helmstedt enroute to Berlin the following day. The Soviets were told that they were being notified "because the vehicles were very wide and could interfere with the regular traffic on the Autobahn." They were also informed that in the future their check points would be notified in advance of any convoy movements on the Autobahn.⁵⁴

During an April meeting between U.S. and Soviet Provost Marshal personnel stationed at the Helmstedt end of the Autobahn, the U.S. official proposed to give the Soviets advance notice on large-size convoys. No specific sizes were mentioned and proposal was accepted. The substance of this agreement was later incorporated into the Berlin Provost Marshal operating procedures. U.S. authorities considered advance notice to be acceptable for outsize equipment and for large convoy movements consisting of 25 or more vehicles and/or 200 or more personnel. Such major convoy movements involved primarily the travel of battle groups to West Germany for annual field training.⁵⁵

d. Later Developments. The general policy outlined above continued until August 1961 when, with the movement of the reinforced battle group

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History of Military Movements Along the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn, 1945-1962, Berlin Bde, IM Div, 1962. Part I and pp. 1-10, Part II. SECRET. NOFORN. No Gp.

53

(1) Cable SX-2590, CINCUSAREUR to Berlin Comd, 1 Apr 59. No Gp.
(2) Memo, Berlin Bde PM Div to DofS, 10 May 62, subj: Practice of Furnishing Soviets Advance Notice on U.S. Convoys Traveling Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn. AEBAB-PM-LN. Gp 4. Both CONF.

54

(1) Memo, 10 May 62, cited above. (2) Memo, Berlin Bde PM for Recd, 1 Jun 59, subj: Autobahn Travel for April and May 1959. AEBPN. In Berlin Bde PM Div 26796 (1959) files. Both CONF. (3) History of Military . . . 1962, cited above, Part II, pp. 17-22. SECRET. NOFORN. All No Gp.

55

(1) Memo, 10 May 62, cited above. (2) Cable USAB-1168, USCOB/CG USAB to USCINCEUR; CINCUSAREUR, 24 May 62. SECRET. Both Gp-4.

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to Berlin and the development of a policy of demonstrating U.S. rights of access on the Autobahn by frequent armed convoy movements, the frequency of convoy movements and the size of routine supply convoys increased considerably. For convenience and expediency and because of the pressure of military and political events, the Berlin Provost Marshal adopted a broader policy of advance notification. He gave advance notice on small troop convoy movements--in one instance on less than 5 vehicles and in other instances on from 5 to 7 vehicles. Generally he gave notice 24 hours in advance, and because of a shortage of Russian-speaking personnel, he adopted the practice of written notification toward the end of the year.

e. New Significance. Advance notice became increasingly important during late 1961 because heavy civilian traffic on the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn congested the check points. This congestion was aggravated when the East Germans constructed a maze of barriers at the points. Thus, during peaks of heavy traffic, convoys of even a few vehicles, especially those arriving without advance notice, were faced with lengthy delays while the traffic lanes were being cleared through parked civilian traffic waiting to be processed.

Except for outsize equipment and large convoy movements that normally called for advance highway clearance by traffic control agencies, advanced notification to the Soviets had its objectionable aspects. First, it implied tacit recognition of such undesirable Soviet clearance procedures as the detailed recording of vehicle registration numbers and the personnel head count, that were not in keeping with the original four-power agreements. It also assisted the Soviets to overcome difficulties in clearing Allied convoys through congested check points where they, themselves, had created traffic delays by erecting barriers. Finally, the addition of these barriers, as well as the continued harassment at Soviet check points, seemed to indicate that voluntary advance notice might lead eventually to a Soviet demand for notification on movements of all military vehicles. The likelihood of such demands became even greater in late December, when Soviet authorities began to request advance notice for all convoys consisting of five or more vehicles.⁵⁶

64. (TS) U.S. Military Assistance Patrols

a. (U) The Need for Assistance Patrols. From 1946 to early 1948 the U.S. Army, with the permission of the Soviet authorities, operated aid and repair stations along the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn. At the beginning of 1948 only one such American station was in operation--at Namitz, 30 miles

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(1) Cable USAB-1168, 24 May 62, cited above. Gp-4. (2) History of Military . . . 1962, cited above, Part II, pp. 27-30. No Gp. Both SECRET. NOFORN.

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west of Berlin. The British operated a similar station about 8 miles farther west.

On 28 March 1948 the Soviets requested the discontinuance of both stations by 1 May, pointing out that the original agreement under which they had been established called for their operation only during the winter months. Though unwilling to do so, the United States had no choice but to accede to the Soviet request. As an alternative, however, the use of regular "courtesy" patrols was initiated for the purpose of offering assistance to U.S. personnel who might be stalled while in transit through the Soviet Zone. These patrols consisted of Berlin infantry and U.S. Constabulary personnel and carried emergency equipment for minor tire and motor repairs. Though objected to by the Soviet authorities, the practice was continued until the Autobahn was blocked in June as part of the over-all blockade of Berlin.⁵⁷

b. (S) Soviet Denial of U.S. Rights to Patrol the Autobahn. After the blockade was lifted in 1949, regular assistance patrols were resumed, and Berlin military police units traveled the Autobahn daily until early May 1952.⁵⁸ At that time westbound patrols were refused passage at the Soviet check point in Berlin. No reasons were given for the action, and eastbound patrols continued unrestricted. On 13 May eastbound units were also refused passage, but two days later all patrols were allowed to pass.

Restrictions at both ends of the Autobahn were reapplied on 27 May and continued without explanation until 10 June, when Soviet authorities made a public rejection of protests filed by the Western Allied Commandants. The Soviets urged that all attempts at sending Autobahn patrols be ceased immediately; and although the demand was rejected as a flagrant breach of four-power agreements on Berlin access, the patrols were completely discontinued in late October 1952.⁵⁹

57


Occupation Forces in Europe--The Third Year, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 1948, Vol I, pp. 29-30. UNCLAS.

58

Report of the Transport Sub-Committee, Economics and Finance Committee, Allied High Commission, to the General Committee, 25 Sep 53, subj: Conventions and Agreements on Berlin, ECO/FIN/TRANS/Sec(53)103; with Annex 14 (revised), subj: Note on Highway Communications Between Berlin and Western Germany. In USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec files. CONF.

59

(1) Berlin Mil Post Comd Rept, 1952, p. 51. SECRET. No Gp.
(2) Post-War Berlin--An Unofficial Chronology, USIS, cited above, p. 14. UNCLAS.



c. (S) The Practice is Set Aside. In 1953, when U.S. and Soviet authorities agreed on unhampered Allied motor traffic on the Autobahn, the Soviets specifically denied the Western Allies' right to operate military police patrols, declaring that Soviet military police were responsible for the maintenance of security and order on the Autobahn. Regular U.S. assistance patrol activities were suspended indefinitely at that time.⁶⁰

d. (S) The Use of Patrols as Convoy Escorts. In early 1959 U.S. officials reconsidered the patrol question and decided that, although Autobahn security was actually a Soviet responsibility, the United States should reserve the right to patrol the highway if Soviet personnel were not present to maintain security. This argument was not considered to be provocative, but rather a normal precautionary measure to be taken by any military force in a country with which no peace treaty had been concluded. Assistance patrols--as operated before--were not immediately reintroduced, however. Instead, military police patrols were initiated as escorts for convoys traveling the Autobahn. This procedure was to be short-lived, however. In May the Soviets raised a protest and the patrols were discontinued on 4 June.⁶¹

e. (C) Irregular Patrols. During the period from late 1959 to September 1961 the Berlin Provost Marshal sent assistance patrols over the Autobahn at irregular intervals. Each patrol consisted of an ordinary military sedan carrying uniformed military police. Conducted at the rate of only 2 or 3 per week, the patrols were not harassed by the Soviets nor were any protests made against their activities.⁶²

f. (TS) Regular Patrols are Resumed. On 21 September 1961 two U.S. Army enlisted men were stopped on the Autobahn by East German police, taken into custody, and confined to prison cells at Potsdam. The following day, Berlin Command military police conducted six round-trip patrols from Berlin to Helmstedt. The patrols consisted of two armed military policemen dressed in regulation uniforms and driving unmarked military jeeps. USCOB's intention was to conduct six patrols daily for four days and then reduce the number to three, hoping to assist U.S.

60

(1) Post War Berlin--An Unofficial Chronology, cited above, p. 14.
UNCLAS. (2) U.S. Army, Berlin, Hist Rept, 1961, p. 66. SECRET. Gp-1.

61

(1) Berlin Comd Ann Hist Rept, 1959, p. 24. (2) Ltr, USAREUR CofS to USCOB, 7 Feb 59. AEAGS-250. Both SECRET. No Gp. (3) USAREUR Ann Hist, FY 1959, TS (info used SECRET). Gp-1.

62

Cable UNN, USBER to Secy State; AMEMB, Bonn, 24 Sep 61. CONF.

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travelers and to guarantee that U.S. access rights for highway patrol were not violated. On 24 September the Soviets protested the patrolling as a violation of an agreement pertaining to "communications controls," and the next day East German police detained a U.S. Air Force sergeant who was traveling the Autobahn. In refutation of their protests, the Soviets were informed that Autobahn patrols were a normal U.S. activity, and six daily round-trip patrols were scheduled permanently.

For over a month the patrols encountered no difficulties in entering or transiting the Soviet Zone. In early October jeeps were replaced by sedans equipped with voice radio communications, and although the Soviets began to "tail" the vehicles on 27 October, no attempts were made to harass the patrols. Two days later, however, the Soviets stopped a patrol vehicle at the Autobahn check point and informed the military policemen that "in compliance with orders issued from the Soviet Commandant in Berlin, no more teams would be allowed entrance to the Autobahn." At the same time a patrol entering the highway at Helmstedt was able to proceed to Berlin without difficulty. Two or three other patrols were refused entrance that afternoon, and as a result the patrols were again suspended.

U.S. officials immediately reexamined the assistance patrol practice. They decided that, irrespective of any disputes that might arise over this specific issue, the United States could not permit unilateral establishment of Soviet rules concerning the type of military vehicles that were to be allowed to travel to and from Berlin. To prevent a misunderstanding, the Soviets were informed that the patrolling of assistance vehicles would be unnecessary if the East German police stopped their harassment, and that the United States would resume the patrols at any time it deemed necessary.⁶³

65. (S) Means of Increasing Autobahn Movements

Meanwhile, another method of exercising Allied access rights on the Autobahn had been devised. In November 1961 the temporary interchange of infantry companies was initiated as a means of increasing the movement of armed U.S. convoys on the Autobahn. Individual motorized infantry companies of Berlin Command moved to a training area near Hildesheim, in the British area of responsibility, within one day's road march of Berlin. There they trained for two days and then returned to Berlin. The departure of each company from Berlin was preceded by the arrival of a Seventh

⁶³ (1) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 38-9. TS. (2) U.S. Army, Berlin, Hist Rept, 1961, pp. 66-9; 96-8. SECRET. Both Gp-1. (3) Post War Berlin--An Unofficial Chronology, cited above, pp. 16-7. UNCLAS.

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Army infantry company that replaced the Berlin unit during its absence.⁶⁴ Under the guise of routine training activities, the new procedure was instrumental in manifesting the U.S. right to use the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn in both directions. However, whereas several Berlin Command companies moved to Hildesheim, only two Seventh Army companies were actually sent to replace them, mainly because the temporary reduction in the strength of the Berlin garrison by one infantry company was considered to be militarily and psychologically insignificant.⁶⁵ By early December USCINCEUR was of the opinion that, in the future, sufficient armed convoy traffic to imply unrestricted use of the Autobahn could be obtained by the movement of Berlin garrison forces whose presence in West Germany was essential to the performance of their regularly-scheduled training missions.⁶⁶

In view of the problems involved in rotating operational units, other means of maintaining the flow of traffic were explored. Part of the military rail traffic to Berlin, for instance, could be shifted to Autobahn trucking, and group leave travel by bus was also under consideration. The over-all objective was to maintain U.S. military traffic over the Autobahn at a flow of perceptible density and regularity.⁶⁷ However, the adoption of such expedients proved unnecessary, because the movements scheduled for 1962 assured sufficiently intensive use of the Autobahn by armed convoys—mainly units engaged in the rotation of battle groups and in regular training in West Germany—and supply convoys.⁶⁸

⁶⁴(1) Cable SX-6990, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army; USCQB, 1 Nov 61. Gp-1. (2) Cable D-343, Berlin Comd to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Nov 61. (3) Cable SX-6833, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 8 Nov 61. Both Gp-4. All SECRET.

⁶⁵(1) Cable D-374, Berlin Comd to CINCUSAREUR, 16 Nov 61. (2) Cable SX-7029, CINCUSAREUR to distr, 18 Nov 61. (3) Cable SX-7615, CINCUSAREUR to USCQB/CG USAB, 17 Dec 61. (4) Intvws, Mr. G. E. Blau, USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec, with Major N. T. Stanfield, Ops Div Trp Ops Br, 12 Dec 61 and 29 Jan 62. All SECRET. Gp-4.

⁶⁶Cable ECJCJ-9-98024, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Dec 61. SECRET. Gp-3.

⁶⁷Cable 254, AMEMB, Bonn to Secy State, 21 Dec 61. SECRET.

⁶⁸(1) Ltr, USAB to USAREUR, 23 Dec 61, subj: Projected Convoy Movements, CY 1962. AEBGC. CONF. (2) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 3 Jan 62, same subject. AEAGC-OP. SECRET. (3) Cable SX 1025, CINCUSAREUR to CG, USAB, 3 Jan 62. CONF. All Gp-4.



66. (S) Contingency Instructions for Identification Procedures

On 1 July 1959 the U.S. Department of State approved a set of instructions for vehicle, convoy, and train commanders traveling to and from Berlin that would be applicable in the event the Soviets were replaced by East Germans at the check points on the surface access routes to Berlin. These instructions covered two situations: (1) if East German personnel should take control of the access routes "as acknowledged agents of the U.S.S.R.", and (2) if East German personnel should take control "on their own"--in other words, as agents of a "sovereign German Democratic Republic." In the first instance the Allies would accept East German control of the check points; in the second instance they would not. The instructions were later approved by the U.S., British, and French Governments.⁶⁹

In September 1961 USCOB reviewed the procedures to be followed if East Germans replaced Soviet officials at the rail and motor check points, and pointed out that since current USAREUR plans implied acceptance of East German control of documentation,⁷⁰ the exercise of that control might lead to delays at the border and to the loss of preferential status by the U.S. Forces. Moreover, if the East Germans imposed inspections of rail and convoy movements they might gain insight into military plans.⁷¹


USAREUR considered these criticisms to be valid and realistic. However, the procedures referred to by USCOB had received quadripartite approval on 30 August 1961 in a revision of the 1959 instructions. Since the quadripartite paper seemed to represent the current Allied position, USAREUR recommended that USCOB's views be submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for reconsideration.⁷²

⁶⁹DF, USAREUR ACoPS G3 to CoFS, 29 Feb 60, subj: Identification and Check Point Procedures for Surface Access to Berlin (U). AEAGC-OP 250/16. SECRET. No Gp.

⁷⁰(1) Ltr, USAREUR to USCOB, 4 Mar 60, subj: Identification and Check Point Procedures for Surface Access to Berlin (U). AEAGC-OP 250/17. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to distr, 15 Aug 60, same subj. AEAGC-OP. Both SECRET. No Gp.

⁷¹Cable COB 414, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 15 Sep 61. SECRET. Gp-3.

⁷²Cable SX-5699, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 18 Sep 61. SECRET. Gp-3.



The quadripartite instructions underwent another revision on 30 November 1961. The new instructions took into consideration that the transfer of check point control from Soviet to East German personnel might take place without warning. Under such circumstances the Allies would still accept the presence of East German personnel at the check points if they merely performed the regular Soviet functions according to standing operating procedures. However, East German attempts to introduce new procedures or documentation requirements would not be accepted and the Western Allies, if refused access by the East Germans according to the old procedures, would consider such action as a violation of access rights. In any case, if East Germans were substituted for Soviets at the check points, traffic to and from Berlin would be halted until instructions were received from higher headquarters.⁷³

In December 1961 the State Department proposed a new policy for identification procedures on the Autobahn. All Allied personnel not in uniform would be authorized to show both orders and identification papers to the East German police, irrespective of the type of vehicle in which they were riding. However, Allied personnel in uniform would not show their orders or identification documents under any circumstances.⁷⁴

From a purely military point of view the impact of implementing the proposed agreement was considered to be insignificant. However, since the decision would have to be based on political considerations, it was noteworthy that current American, British, and French procedures differed principally in the fact that the British had already authorized the proposed procedure. Moreover, while the current U.S. practice of not showing any papers to the East German police had resulted in some harassment at their hands, no undue hardship had been caused.

The existing contingency instructions were based on previously-reached quadripartite agreements and provided for showing orders and identification papers to the East Germans at the check points if they took control of the access routes as agents of the U.S.S.R. However, so long as the status quo continued, it would seem inconsistent to

⁷³BQD 4, Second Revision, Quadripartite Ambassadorial Group, 30 Nov 61, subj: Ground Access - Checkpoint Procedures: Instructions for Procedures to be followed if the Soviets transfer to East German Personnel Functions Relating to Allied Ground Access. SECRET.

⁷⁴Cable ECJCJ-9-98176, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Dec 61. SECRET. Gp-3.

SECRET

authorize personnel traversing the Autobahn to show orders and identification papers to East Germans, but to prohibit such action at the check points. Moreover, to accede to East German demands for identification along the Autobahn might hasten the turnover of check points.

Finally, it seemed important that uniform policies be applied to all check points--those on the Autobahn as well as those leading into East Berlin. Although technical reasons might exist for differentiating between the Autobahn and East Berlin, the same identification procedures should be applied to both locations. Moreover, the new policy, if adopted, should be implemented only during a period of relative calm, not while the Allies were under pressure or propaganda attack.⁷⁵

⁷⁵(1) Cable COB-493, USAB to CINCUSAREUR, 11 Dec 61. Gp-3. (2) Cable SX-7782, CINCUSAREUR to USCINCEUR, 11 Dec 61. Gp-4. (3) Cable ECJCO-9-98638, USCINCEUR to JCS, 18 Dec 61. Gp-4. All SECRET.



Chapter 13


The Air Corridors (U)

67. (U) The Basic Agreement

Shortly after the Allied Forces entered Berlin in 1945, the Soviets began to charge the Western Allies with violations of air-safety regulations and digressions from the air corridor to Berlin.¹ At that time there were no formal agreements concerning access to Berlin by air or by any other means, but British and American officers at the operational level had made a verbal agreement with Soviet officials that Western pilots en route to Berlin were to follow the line of the railroad, or the Autobahn, leading from Helmstedt across the Soviet Zone. (See Map 4.) This agreement meant that American planes coming from South Germany had to fly north to Helmstedt and then make a right-angle turn. The flights required visual navigation, and since there were no navigational aids in the Soviet Zone to facilitate "bad-weather" flights, all pilots, including the Soviets, had occasional difficulties.

When the Soviets began to protest alleged Allied safety violations, therefore, the United States proposed that a uniform code be established for all of Germany, assuming that Berlin would again become the German capital and would resume its position as the national air center. The U.S. proposal outlined six airways, or corridors, that would radiate out from Berlin in every direction--to Hamburg, Hannover, Frankfurt, Warsaw, Prague, and Copenhagen. The British requested a seventh corridor from Hannover to Prague. Each lane would be 20 miles wide and could be used freely by aircraft of the "four" Allied nations. Navigational aids would be constructed on the Berlin approaches, and uniform safety rules

¹Clay, cited above, p. 115. UNCLAS.



would be adopted by all four powers and administered by a quadripartite Berlin Air Safety Center.

Moscow refused immediately to accept the proposed Copenhagen, Warsaw, Prague, and Hannover-Prague corridors, because these airways were "for the usual interstate traffic and were not essential to the needs of the occupation forces in Berlin."² They also demanded that flights through the other three corridors be limited specifically to aircraft actually serving the needs of those military forces. Although the United States agreed to limit the number of corridors to three, it insisted that the remaining corridors should be open to all air traffic, subject to agreed safety regulations.³


Meanwhile, on 30 November 1945, the Allied Control Council decided that the Hamburg, Hannover, and Frankfurt corridors were to be set up for communication between Berlin and West Germany and that flights through these lanes could proceed without advance notice. The responsibility for drawing up safety measures and flight rules in the corridors would rest with the Air Directorate of the Control Council. After this preparatory agreement, the four-power Air Directorate prepared a set of specifications and rules for flights within the corridors. However, the air corridors were not actually established until several months later, when the Soviets dropped all objections to their unrestricted use.

The agreed-upon directives described the location of the three airways and provided—as proposed—that they were to be 20 miles wide. It also established a "Berlin control zone" extending 20 miles in every direction from the Allied Control Council building in Berlin and including all air space up to 10,000 feet. Aircraft entering this zone were to give certain identifying information to a four-power Berlin Air Safety Center, also provided for in the agreement; and finally, pilots were to adhere to a number of flight safety rules.⁴

²(1) Davison, cited above, pp. 34-5. (2) Report of the Allied Control Authority, 22 Nov 45, subj: Creation of a System of Air Corridors to be Used for Flights in the Respective Areas of Occupation in Germany. Cy in USAREUR Ops Div Hist Sec files. Both UNCLAS.

³The Berlin Crisis: A Report on the Moscow Discussions. Dept of State Pub 3298, p. 48. UNCLAS.

⁴(1) "Minutes of Meeting of Control Council Approving Establishment of Air Corridors, November 30, 1945." (2) "Minutes of Meeting of Allied Control Authority Air Directorate, Concerning Air Corridors, December 18, 1945." Both in Documents on Germany, cited above, pp. 48-9; 51-2. (3) Clay, cited above, p. 115. All UNCLAS.



The Air Safety Center was established in February 1946. Operating on a 24-hour basis, it continued to function with relatively little friction even after other relations among the occupying powers had deteriorated.⁵

68. (S) The Harassment

a. Incidents. Although U.S. aircraft were only occasionally harassed in the air corridors, incidents, when they did occur, were usually of a very serious nature because they endangered the lives of crews and passengers. In most instances, Soviet military planes would "tail" western aircraft at distances as close as 100 yards and would perform stunts and maneuvers "dangerously close" to the planes. On 8 October 1952, Soviet MIG's actually fired upon an American hospital plane--the only instance of this kind. This latter fact, however, appeared to be merely coincidental, since British and French planes were fired upon several times while enroute to and from Berlin.⁶

b. Soviet Protests. Except for the infrequent incidents in the corridors, Soviet harassment consisted mainly of protests against alleged American violations of the air corridor agreement. Such protests, based on accusations that U.S. pilots had drifted outside the limits of the corridors, were filed frequently with the Berlin Air Safety Center and with USAREUR headquarters.

Procedures for processing communications with the Soviets regarding their protests were developed by agreement between USAREUR, USAFE, and the U.S. High Commissioner on 27 October 1954. Since CINCUSAREUR had been designated as the single point of contact with the Soviet Forces in Germany, USAREUR received and transmitted to USAFE all messages regarding U.S. aircraft violations in the corridors. After USAFE had completed its investigation, the U.S. High Commissioner and--later--the U.S. Embassy in Bonn drafted a reply that was forwarded to USAREUR for signature and dispatch to Soviet authorities.⁷

⁵British Zone Review, British Element of the Control Commission for Germany, 19 Mar 49, pp. 19, 21. UNCLAS.

⁶ (1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 478-9. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1955, pp. 338-9. Both SECRET. Gp-1. (3) Post-War Berlin--An Unofficial Chronology, cited above, p. 14. UNCLAS.

⁷USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1955, p. 339. SECRET. Gp-1.



69. (S) The Issues

a. (S) East German Sovereignty. (S) The Western Allies experienced no difficulties with the East German regime over the air corridors until 20 September 1955, when the Soviet Commandant in Berlin announced that East Berlin was part of the sovereign "German Democratic Republic." The East German authorities immediately announced that the air corridors would be closed unless the Western Allies paid tolls for aircraft crossing East German territory. Although the West regarded the announcement as an empty threat, which it proved to be, this event was the beginning of a long Soviet-East German campaign to discredit Western rights in the air corridors.⁸

(C) On 7 January 1957, a joint Soviet-East German declaration issued in Moscow asserted that "existing four-power treaties regarding the use of air corridors between Berlin and West Germany by aircraft of the United States, United Kingdom, and France [had] a temporary and limited character and [did] not affect the principle of recognition of air sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic." To counter the possible threat posed by this announcement, CINCSAREUR recommended that stern measures be adopted to preserve the Allied rights of air access to Berlin. The U.S. policy was based on three premises: that there be no recognition of the East German claims to sovereignty in the Soviet Zone airspace; that there be no reciprocity of rights between East and West; and that there be no impingement upon the rights of the Western Allies to unrestricted access to Berlin via the air corridors. Nevertheless, the Soviets continued to use the issue as a means of achieving recognition for the East German regime. They insisted that flights of Allied aircraft over East Germany be conducted in "strict conformity with the principle of the recognition of the sovereignty of the two German states."⁹

b. (U) The Altitude Dispute. On 27 March 1959 Soviet fighters buzzed an American C-130 cargo plane that was flying in the air corridors at an altitude of 18,000 feet. Replying to a U.S. protest over the incident, the Soviets insisted that flights at altitudes higher than 10,000 feet were inadmissible. Their attempt to limit altitudes, based on the prevailing practice of not flying higher than 10,000 feet, was rejected. Another American plane flying at a high altitude was buzzed on 3 April, and Soviet fighters "escorted" a U.S. aircraft on 15 April flying at 20,000 feet. Following the latter incident, the British asked the U.S. Government to discontinue flights at altitudes higher than 10,000 feet in the corridors.

⁸Berlin Comd Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, p. 92. SECRET. No Gp.

⁹USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, p. 307-8. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

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In reply, the U.S. Department of State maintained that logistical flights for the American garrison in West Berlin would continue to be made at higher altitudes, whenever necessary.

On 29 February 1960 the three Western Allies announced they would resume high altitude flights in the corridors. The Soviet Embassy in East Berlin declared that any flight over 10,000 feet would be regarded as a unilateral violation of four-power agreements, arguing that practice had created a "law." The Western Allies decided on 3 March, therefore, to postpone any further high altitude flights to Berlin until the matter had been negotiated with the Soviets. They did not, however, renounce their right to make such flights.¹⁰

c. (S) Interference with Commercial Air Traffic. On 2 September 1961 the Soviets transmitted to the three Western Allies new notes alleging misuse of the air corridors by both West German and Allied aircraft. The notes asserted that there were no four-power agreements on uncontrolled commercial air traffic to West Berlin via the air corridors. On 15 September two American commercial airliners flying to Berlin were buzzed by Soviet fighters. The United States protested to the Soviet representative in the Berlin Air Safety Center, but the message apparently was ignored, because on the following day another American commercial passenger plane flying from Berlin to Frankfurt was molested by a Soviet jet fighter.


In October the Soviets further complicated the air corridor issue by announcing at the Air Safety Center that the safety of Allied military aircraft flying within the 20-mile Berlin control zone could no longer be guaranteed.¹¹

70. (TS) Missile Protection

After analyzing the actions that the Soviet/East German forces might take to harass or stop Western Allied commercial flights through the air corridors, CINCUSAREUR proposed in September 1961 the deployment of one Nike Hercules missile battalion at the corridors' portals in West Germany. This concept was in conflict with USAFE's original plan for protecting the corridors by fighter planes and limited ground-to-air small arms fire.

¹⁰ Post-War Berlin--An Unofficial Chronology, cited above, Vol II pp. 4-5, Vol III, pp. 11-2. UNCLAS.

¹¹ (1) U.S. Army, Berlin, Hist Rept, 1961, p. 103. SECRET. Gp-1.
(2) Post-War Berlin--An Unofficial Chronology, cited above, Vol VII, pp. 1-2, 6-7. UNCLAS.



The USAREUR proposal envisaged deploying one battery in West Berlin and three batteries at the three western entrances of the air corridors, thus providing overlapping protection for all three of the corridors. The Air Defense Commander would exercise operational control over the battalion, the basic load of which would be limited to high explosive warheads.

In transmitting these recommendations to CINCUSAFE, USAREUR pointed out that, to be effective as both a psychological and tactical deterrent, the deployment of the Nike Hercules battalion should be expedited so that it would take place before the Soviet/East German forces committed overt acts of aggression.¹²

Before the end of the year, opposition to the suggestion had developed. CINCUSAFE, though not directly opposed, was concerned with the effect that the deployment of an entire Nike Hercules battalion for protection of the Berlin air corridors might have on the surface-to-air missile defense of Central Europe. General Clay, the President's Berlin representative, stated that he could not visualize an air battle over the corridors unless there was also ground conflict. In that event the stationing of Nike units in Berlin and West Germany could not have the desired effect, since their locations would render them vulnerable to quick destruction by opposing ground artillery fire. He added that the introduction of nuclear-capable weapons would subject Berlin to direct Soviet attack and frighten the city's population. At the end of 1961, the question was still under discussion.¹³

¹² (1) DF, USAREUR DCSOPS to CofS, 23 Sep 61, subj: NIKE HERCULES Deployment (U). AEAGC-OP. (2) Cable SX-5861, CINCUSAREUR to CINCUSAFE, 25 Sep 61. Both TS. Gp-4.

¹³ (1) Ltr, Seventh Army to USAREUR, 15 Dec 61. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, p. 141. Both TS. Gp-3.



Chapter 14

The Borders (U)

71. (U) General

The post-World War II boundaries that had been established between the Western zones of Germany and between the Western sectors of Berlin gradually dissolved, creating a political and economic entity, as the three Western Allies increased their efforts to reconstruct an economically and politically stable, democratic Germany. While this unification was taking place in the West, another even more significant development, designed to achieve a completely opposite goal, was taking place in the East. There, the boundaries that separated the Soviet zone of Germany from Berlin and from the Western occupation areas and the borders that divided the Soviet sector of Berlin from the Western sectors were being systematically made permanent.

72. (S) The Initial Situation

a. (C) In Berlin. In 1945 there were 163 streets and roads in the Soviet zone that either crossed into the Western sectors of Berlin or ended at the border. Approximately 255 streets crossed the border between the Soviet and the Western sectors of the city. Berlin's population used these routes freely. Even Western Allied soldiers, though not encouraged to do so, crossed the borders with relative freedom, as did Soviet military personnel. At times, Western and Soviet military police patrolled the city together, to cope with situations that might involve one nation's soldiers in another nation's sector.

This complete freedom of movement was short-lived. The lack of Soviet cooperation in dealing with incidents involving Western military personnel in the Soviet sector, together with the frequent unreasonable arrests of Western soldiers, forced Western authorities to issue regulations prohibiting

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military travel in the Soviet zone and sector except on official business or on sponsored tours. Soviet authorities also began slowly to close civilian access routes from their zone into West Berlin, and to establish an "open and closed door" policy with regard to certain streets crossing the border between sectors. In this latter case, however, streets were closed only to vehicular traffic; pedestrians circulated freely, although borders guards occasionally checked their credentials and baggage.¹

b. (C) During the Blockade. (U) The first instance of Soviet efforts to obstruct free circulation in Berlin seriously began on 19 October 1948, when police established a ring of road blocks around the Western sectors and the Communists thus tightened their grip on the city's supply routes. To halt the movement of all food, coal, and other rationed items from East Berlin and the Soviet zone, the communist authorities set up check points at 40 railway stations around West Berlin, and East Berlin police manned road blocks in streets running through the center of the city. All vehicular traffic from the Soviet zone was stopped and diverted around the Western sectors into East Berlin. Although pedestrian traffic was not halted, all food and other rationed items discovered on persons desiring to enter the Western sectors were confiscated, and summary courts were organized near the check points to sentence "smugglers," on the spot, to forced labor.²

(C) When the blockade was lifted in 1949, restrictions on the routes leading into the Western sectors were also relaxed. While the Soviets reverted to their pre-blockade open and closed policy, there was a noticeable trend toward an increase in the number of permanently-closed routes from the Soviet zone and sector into West Berlin.³

c. (S) At the East-West German Border.

(1) (S) Military Access. When traveling eastward to Berlin, U.S. military personnel were authorized to use only two crossing points into the Soviet zone—the Autobahn check point at Helmstedt and the nearby rail check point at Marienborn. In the American-Soviet border agreement of 5 August 1946, other crossing points to the East had been designated for the

¹(1) Draft Study, Dept of State, 6 Aug 54, subj: German Inter-Zonal Travel, pp. 18-9. In USBER file No. 341. CONF. (2) Alistair Horne, Back Into Power (London, 1955), p. 23. UNCLAS. (3) International Aspects, cited above, p. 132. UNCLAS.

²Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 20 Oct 48, pp. 1, 12. UNCLAS.

³Draft Study, Dept of State, 6 Aug 54, cited above. CONF.

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passage of military personnel bearing the proper documentation and having authorized business on either side. Actually, however, U.S. occupation personnel had never been granted access to the Soviet zone by any other crossing point, mainly because of a Soviet interpretation of the term "authorized business," which was based on the evident desire to restrict U.S. travel as much as possible.⁴

(2) (C) German Civilian Access. The interzonal permits introduced by the four occupation powers in 1945 allowed certain German civilians—physicians, ministers, employees of the Allied Control Council, etc.—to cross zonal boundaries. Before 1947 the Soviets appeared to have no general policy with respect to enforcing the permit regulation and controlling their interzonal borders. In fact, in many cases they assisted civilians in the Soviet zone to cross the border illegally into the West. During September of that year, however, East German border patrols were reinforced with Soviet troops, and in March 1948 additional Soviet soldiers and East German guards were assigned to border posts. Simultaneously, stringent document and baggage checks were imposed on travelers leaving the Soviet zone.

When the Western zones were unified, the interzonal permits were discarded, at first for travel between the U.S. and British zones in September 1946 and later within the territory of West Germany. The Soviets, however, continued to require this permit for travel to and from their zone until 1953.⁵


73. (S) Gradual Isolation

a. (S) The Soviets Tighten Their Grip. By 1 August 1951, 63 of the 163 routes leading from the Soviet zone into West Berlin had been closed to all forms of traffic. On 1 September Soviet authorities also imposed a heavy road tax on all vehicles licensed in West Berlin and Western Germany that used the Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn or other roads in the Soviet zone.⁶

⁴ A Survey of Soviet Aims, Policies, and Tactics, cited above, p. 183. SECRET. Gp-1.

⁵(1) EUCOM Hist Div, International Aspects of the Occupation 1 July 1946 - 30 June 1947, pp. 59-60. CONF. Gp-3. (2) EUCOM Hist Div, The Third Year of the Occupation 1 January - 31 March 1948, Vol I, p. 56. (3) Pamphlet, Every Fifth Person, Federal Ministry of All-German Affairs, 1962, pp. 20-1. Both UNCLAS.

⁶(1) Draft Study, Dept of State, 6 Aug 54, cited above. CONF. (2) Post-War Berlin--An Unofficial Chronology, Vol I, p. 13. UNCLAS.




Then, following the signing of the Contractual Agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1952, the Soviets initiated a new program to "seal off" Berlin. On 27 May East German authorities cut all telephone communications between West Berlin and the Soviet zone and sector. In addition, they announced the complete closing of borders between West Germany and East Germany and between the Western and Eastern sectors of Berlin. On 1 June Soviet troops and East German police began sealing some of the remaining routes between West Berlin and the Soviet zone, and within a few days all but 32 of these thoroughfares were completely closed. More than half of the 255 streets connecting East and West Berlin were blocked; the West Berlin enclave of Eiskeller was temporarily isolated; other small western enclaves beyond the city's borders were occupied by Soviet troops; and special documentation for entering the Soviet zone was introduced. At the same time a 500-mile Iron Curtain between West Germany and the East zone was erected in front of a deep "death strip," and barriers were constructed at the crossing points.⁷

b. (U) Protest. The Western Allies protested to Soviet headquarters on 28 June, arguing that the recent actions violated the 1949 four-power agreements. The Soviets replied that the East Germans were merely attempting to prevent the entry of "diversionists, spies, and terrorists" into their territory.⁸

c. (S) Further Restrictions. During the summer and fall of 1952, increased border harassments and propaganda efforts on the part of the Soviets were obviously aimed at tightening communist control over all traffic entering or leaving West Berlin. In September and October eight observation towers, manned by both Soviet troops and East German police, were placed at strategic intervals along the West Berlin zonal border. In September, also, the East German police instituted a rigid control system along the southern part of that border and began to require documentation of all German residents who desired to cross from either side. The control system was tightened progressively, along the entire zonal/sector border, by the barricading of streets with barbed wire and ditches until, at the end of 1952, only 8 passages remained open.

⁷(1) Horne, cited above, p. 25. (2) McInnis, cited above, p. 135.
(3) Post-War Berlin--An Unofficial Chronology, cited above, Vol I, p. 14.
(4) Berlin--Fate and Mission, cited above, p. 20. All UNCLAS. (5) Berlin Mil Post Comd Rept, p. 52. SECRET. No Gp.

⁸(1) Berlin--Fate and Mission, cited above, p. 20. (2) Post-War Berlin--An Unofficial Chronology, cited above, Vol I, p. 14. Both UNCLAS.



Meanwhile, East Berlin police took further steps to restrict the passage of both persons and vehicles between the East and West sectors of Berlin. At certain street crossings personal documentation was checked, and in many instances the checks resulted in persons on both sides being turned back. Other crossings were blocked completely. Beginning in early December, purchases made by West Berlin residents in the Eastern sector were confiscated at the border. On occasion, West Berlin-licensed vehicles were turned back or impounded, evidently to deter the passengers from making purchases in the future.⁹ Repeated Western protests that these events violated quadripartite agreements brought no results.¹⁰

During 1953 Soviet and East German authorities continued to close civilian highway and railway crossing points between West Germany and the Soviet zone. Heavily-armed police parties also encroached upon the sector border in Berlin and interfered with the flow of traffic. On 15 January streetcar traffic between East and West Berlin was halted completely and finally. In addition, intracity transportation facilities on the Berlin subway (U-Bahn) and on the elevated lines (S-Bahn) were constantly harassed.¹¹


d. (S) 17 June 1953. When an East German uprising occurred in the Soviet sector on 17 June 1953, Soviet troops and tanks, East Berlin police, and East German military police sealed off the sector borders. On 21 June three streets were designated as the only East-West sector crossing points for civilians; the movements of Western Allied military personnel were not restricted. All S-Bahn service in West Berlin was suspended, but highway, barge, and rail traffic between West Germany and West Berlin remained open. By the first week of July, after the uprising had been quelled, most of the streets that had been closed along the sector border were reopened.¹²

⁹Berlin Mil Post Comd Rept, 1952, p. 53. SECRET. No Gp.

¹⁰USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, p. 469. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹¹(1) Ibid., pp. 469-70. SECRET. Gp-1. (2) Berlin—Figures, Headings, Charts, cited above, p. 14. UNCLAS.

¹²Berlin Comd Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 91-2. SECRET. No Gp.



e. (U) The Allied High Commissioners React. On 26 August 1953 the three Allied High Commissioners addressed a sharp note to the Soviets, asking for the elimination of the zonal barriers and the restrictions on freedom of movement between East and West, both in Germany as a whole and in Berlin. In their reply of 17 September the Soviets tried to use the issue for initiating negotiations between West Germany and the East German regime, but the Allied High Commissioners insisted that it was a subject falling solely within the authority of the occupation powers.¹³

When the Soviets discontinued the interzonal permit requirement on 25 November, the East German regime immediately issued a regulation stipulating, on the one hand, that anyone who wanted to leave the Soviet zone would be deprived of his identity card and, on the other, that entry into East German-controlled territory would not be allowed except with a residence permit.

The situation in Berlin remained unchanged.¹⁴

f. (S) Autobahn Tolls. At the end of May 1955, in reaction to the granting of full sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany, the East German regime increased the tolls payable by West German vehicles using the Autobahn. The three Allied High Commissioners, acting on behalf of the Federal Republic, met with the Soviet High Commissioner on 20 May 1955 in an attempt to persuade the Soviets to revoke this action and restore the former tolls. However, the Soviets declared that the toll dispute did not constitute an abrogation of the 1949 agreement regarding Allied access to Berlin. The Allied conferees had the impression that the Soviet authorities were using the dispute—according to their custom—as a means of forcing the Federal Republic to recognize the authority of the East German regime. While the United States refused to recognize that regime, the West German transport officials were encouraged to meet with their East German counterparts in an effort to reach a solution.¹⁵ The subsequent negotiations between West and East German officials brought

¹³ Post-War Berlin--An Unofficial Chronology, cited above, Vol I, p. 17. UNCLAS.

¹⁴ Every Fifth Person, cited above, p. 21. UNCLAS.

¹⁵ CINCUSAREUR's Monthly Amb-Comdrs Conf, 31 May 55. In USAREUR SGS 337/1 (1955) File, (B/P #5). SECRET. No Gp.

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about some reductions in the Autobahn tolls which, however, remained prohibitive for several months until they were finally lowered.¹⁶

g. (S) Relaxed Tension. By mid-1956, the East Germans, in line with Soviet policies, had relaxed the tension between the Eastern and Western sectors of Berlin. East Germans were allowed to visit West Berlin more freely, and the number of control points on the sector border was reduced. Simultaneously, the East Germans reduced the intensity of personnel, baggage, and identity paper checks on all access routes to West Berlin.¹⁷

h. (S) East German Controls. (C) Beginning in October 1957, another tightening of communist controls on all borders became noticeable.


(1) (C) The Currency Reform. On the morning of 13 October a zone-wide East German currency reform was announced for that afternoon. The communist authorities immediately applied strict controls at all sector border crossing points and halted outbound German traffic from West Berlin. Allied traffic, however, was still permitted to continue on the Autobahn and between the sectors of the city. Allied protests that these restrictions were contrary to the provisions of the Paris Agreement had no effect.

(2) (C) A New Passport Law. During the following weeks it became evident that the newly-imposed border controls were not isolated incidents, but part of a new communist campaign to stem the flow of refugees toward the West. On 11 December a new passport law, promulgated by the East German regime, made leaving the Soviet zone without a passport, and in fact the preparation for or attempt at such travel, punishable by imprisonment. Passes, issued only for specific trips, had to be surrendered within three days following return. As a result of this law, other restrictive measures, and tighter border controls, the 1958 total of persons traveling between East and West Germany was one third less than that of the preceding year.¹⁸

¹⁶CINCUSAREUR's Monthly Amb-Comdrs Conf, 30 Jun 55. In same file. (B/P #6). SECRET. No Gp.

¹⁷Berlin Comd Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 93-4. SECRET. No Gp.

¹⁸(1) USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 296-7. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1. (2) Berlin--Fate and Mission, cited above, p. 30. (3) Every Fifth Person, cited above, p. 21. Both UNCLAS.



(3) (S) New Restrictions on West Germans. To demonstrate its power to control traffic to and from West Berlin, on 30 August 1960 the East German regime again imposed new restrictions on the travel of West German citizens to Berlin and on their entry into East Berlin. The pretext was that the West Berlin rallies of former German prisoners of war and of German expellees from Soviet satellite countries, scheduled for 1-4 September, were "revenge-seeking and war-mongering" activities.

The three Allied Commandants in Berlin protested to their Soviet counterpart that these restrictions violated the right of free circulation in Berlin and contravened the Paris Agreement. In remonstrating against this infringement of the city's quadripartite status, the Allied Commandants emphasized the common responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in Berlin.


The Western note had no apparent effect, because the East German regime reinforced its border control personnel to implement the travel control measures. In addition, the East Germans increased the tension by enforcing load restrictions on canal barges bound for West Berlin, on the pretext that the water level was too low, and by announcing on 8 September that West German citizens would have to obtain special permits before they could enter East Berlin. A few days later, the Soviet Commandant emphatically rejected the Allied allegations. The Commandants protested again, but to no avail.

(4) (S) Interference with U.S. Rights. The most flagrant case of restriction on intra-Berlin movement during this period involved U.S. Ambassador Walter C. Dowling who, when driving to East Berlin on the afternoon of 22 September in an official vehicle showing U.S. license plates and flying an American flag, was stopped at the Brandenburg Gate. East German police questioned his right to enter the Soviet Zone and asked to see his identification. The Ambassador showed his State Department pass, and was allowed to enter. When the incident was protested, the Soviets replied with the routine statement concerning "East German sovereignty," a reference to Berlin as the capital of East Germany, and a rejection of the Western protest as an attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.¹⁹

74. (S) Status At End of 1961

(S) Through the barricading and border-crossing restrictions that began

¹⁹(1) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1960, pp. 55-8. TS (info used SECRET).
Gp-1. (2) Cable COBU-445, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 23 Sep 60. FOUO.



on 12 August 1961,²⁰ Western Allied military personnel, who before August had been able to enter East Berlin at any one of 120 crossing points, were restricted to the single entrance on Friedrichstrasse, from the American sector. This crossing, which the U.S. Berlin Command manned continuously with a military police detachment and which soon became known to Americans as Checkpoint Charlie, had to be used also by all Western Allied civilians, including personnel of the diplomatic corps.²¹ There were no crossing points for East German or East Berlin residents.


(S) The Western Allies meanwhile continued to assert their rights of access to East Berlin and of movement within the entire city. However, in mid-October U.S. military personnel failed in an attempt to gain access to East Berlin via a crossing point other than Friedrichstrasse. Later in the month, the East German demand that U.S. personnel wearing civilian clothing produce identification documents before entering East Berlin led to threats of military action, as Soviet and U.S. tanks faced each other across Checkpoint Charlie. On 7 November, therefore, CINC-USAREUR directed that all U.S. military personnel entering East Berlin wear uniforms, and that dependents and civilian personnel having an official relationship with any agency of the U.S. Government abstain from entering East Berlin.²²

(U) By the end of 1961, the wall dividing Berlin had been reinforced and topped with barbed wire, and the flow of refugees into West Berlin had been stopped completely except in scattered instances. Only seven crossing points remained open. American, British, and French personnel were still restricted to Checkpoint Charlie; citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany could enter East Berlin at two points; and the small number of West Berliners who worked in East Berlin and held a special pass could enter at four others. There were still no crossing points for East Berlin residents, and the more than 50,000 commuters who had held regular jobs in West Berlin could no longer report for work.

²⁰See Chapter 3, pp. 31-3. SECRET. Gp-1.

²¹(1) Berlin - August 13, cited above, p. 48. (2) Heinrich Siegler, Von der gescheiterten Gipfelkonferenz Mai 1960 zur Berlinsperre August 1961 (Bonn-Vienna-Zurich, 1961), pp. 112-3. Both UNCLAS. (3) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, p. 48. TS (info used SECRET). Gp-1. (4) Cable AEBGC-D-247, Berlin Comd to CINCUSAREUR, 26 Sep 61. SECRET. Gp-4. (5) Stars & Stripes (Eur. ed.), 14 Aug 61, pp. 1, 24. UNCLAS.

²²USAREUR Ann Hist, 1961, pp. 34-54. TS (info used SECRET). Gp-1.



Around the 110-kilometers of "no man's land" that separated West Berlin from the Soviet Zone, there were 157 booms, barricades, barbed wire fences, and earthen walls.²³

²³(1) Jorn Donner, Report from Berlin (Bloomington, 1961), p. 60.
(2) Berlin - August 13, cited above, p. 48. Both UNCLAS.

Chapter 15

Steinstuecken (U)

75. (S) The Exclave

a. (FOUO) Background. Steinstuecken is a small German community of approximately 170 inhabitants. Geographically it is an exclave separated from the main body of the U.S. sector of Berlin by a narrow strip of Soviet Zone territory. It covers 27-3/4 acres and is linked with West Berlin by a path which is 10 feet wide and 1,250 yards long and over which vehicles can be driven. The community became a part of Wannsee in 1898. When Wannsee, in turn, became a part of Greater Berlin on 27 April 1920, it was specified that it would form part of Zehlendorf. Under the European Advisory Committee Agreement of 1944, Steinstuecken was to be a part of the U.S. sector, even though a strip of communist-held territory separated it from West Berlin.¹

b. (C) The First Incidents. (C) From 1945 until 1951 there was reasonably normal access, in both directions, between West Berlin and Steinstuecken. On 18 October 1951, however, the first major incident occurred when East German police occupied Steinstuecken in an attempt to incorporate the exclave into the German Democratic Republic. After seriously considering the use of force to restore the situation, USCOB filed a strong protest with the Soviets. Three days later he was informed that the Soviets had ordered the East Germans to withdraw their police from Steinstuecken and to allow that community to revert to its former status.

(C) The East German police withdrew on 23 October 1951, and on the next day a West German police patrol of three men was dispatched to

¹Memo, USBER, 24 Sep 55, subj: Access to Steinstuecken. FOUO.

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Steinstuecken. They remained there until 28 October, when the Soviets prevented the relief patrol from entering the exclave. Thereafter, despite long negotiations, the Western Allies were unable to modify the Soviet decision, and no West Berlin policeman has been in Steinstuecken since.²

(FOUO) The next incident occurred in June 1952, when the East German authorities issued an ordinance which had the effect of denying, to all West Berliners, access to East German areas outside the city limits. This denial automatically shut off access to Steinstuecken, although residents of the exclave were still allowed to pass freely. The Soviet authorities and the East German border guards set up check points at both ends of the lane leading to Steinstuecken. At first, they did not enforce the ordinance strictly, but on 30 July 1954 they suddenly began to insist on the showing of transit passes.³

c. (S) New Significance of the Exclave. On 7 August 1958 some 800 East German policemen surrounded Steinstuecken, entered it from all sides, and seized a political refugee, claiming that he was a deserter. When the U.S. Commandant protested to the Soviets, the East German authorities denied the invasion, but admitted the arrest. The Soviet Commandant rejected the U.S. protest, claiming that the incident was merely an internal affair of the sovereign East German state.

After this incident, the degree of U.S. firmness shown with respect to Steinstuecken came to symbolize in the minds of many Berliners--and even other Germans, East and West--the determination of the United States with regard to Berlin.⁴

d. (S) The Ring is Tightened. In February 1960 two East Germans sought refuge in Steinstuecken. While U.S. authorities prepared plans to evacuate them by helicopter, they were informed that the refugees had departed, their whereabouts unknown. This incident demonstrated the need for clarification of the rights of access of the U.S. and West Berlin authorities to the exclave.⁵

²Draft, U.S. Army, Berlin, Hist Rept, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 62, pp. 71-2. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.

³Memo, USBER, 24 Sep 55, cited above. FOUO.

⁴(1) Berlin since World War II: A Chronology (1945-58), p. 8. UNCLAS. (2) Internal Memo, USBER, 16 Oct 58, subj: Possible Resolution of Steinstuecken Problem, in USBER files. SECRET.

⁵Draft, Berlin Comd Hist Rept, 1 Jan - 31 Mar 60, p. 5. SECRET. No Gp.

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A few months later, on 23 September 1960, the East German authorities tightened the ring around Steinstuecken by instituting a new procedure for West Berlin citizens who wanted to visit the exclave. While hitherto a transit pass had sufficed, these West Berliners were now required to obtain a new-type pass permitting entrance into the Potsdam district of the German Democratic Republic. For West Berliners, visits to Steinstuecken were thus placed definitely in the same category as visits to East Germany.⁶ Finally, on 2 September 1961, three weeks after the Berlin wall had been erected, the East German police began to unload construction materials in the Steinstuecken area, and within a month the exclave was surrounded by two barbed-wire fences, 8 feet high, and the area between them was covered with concertina wire.


On 21 September, General Clay flew to Steinstuecken by helicopter to inspect the situation personally--the first time that a U.S. official had visited the exclave--and on the next day a U.S. 3-man military police patrol was flown in for permanent stationing. Immediately after its arrival, four persons sought refuge in the exclave and were evacuated by helicopter. Later it was decided that future evacuations would be coordinated with the weekly exchange of military police personnel and the delivery of supplies for the patrol.

During the following months, East German laborers cleared trees and underbrush along the perimeter of the exclave, under the watchful eyes of the communist police; but even so, a few refugees succeeded in escaping to the exclave, from which they were evacuated by air.⁷

e. (S) The Search for a Solution. At the end of 1961 the situation at Steinstuecken was far from satisfactory, because workmen and other categories of persons from West Berlin were refused access to the exclave and there was constant danger of incidents. Even visits by garbage trucks, fire trucks or ambulances had to be scheduled three days in advance, except under emergency conditions. The U.S. Mission in Berlin therefore proposed approaching the Soviet Commandant and making

⁶USAREUR Ann Hist, 1960, p. 58. TS (info used SECRET). Gp-1.

⁷(1) Cables COB 421, 422, and 425, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 25, 26, and 28 Sep 61. Gp-3. (2) Cables COB 428 and 429, same to same, 2 and 3 Oct 61. Gp-4. (3) Cable ECJCO-9-94344, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 3 Oct 61. Gp-4. (4) Cable COB-438, USCOB to CINCUSAREUR, 9 Oct 61. Gp-3. All SECRET. (5) Cable COB-441, same to same, 10 Oct 61. (6) Cable ECDC-9-96269, USCINCEUR to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Nov 61. Gp-4. (7) Cable SX-6784, CINCUSAREUR to USCOB, 5 Nov 61. Gp-3. All CONF.


constructive suggestions toward settling the problem amicably. In approving the recommendation in principle, the Secretary of State warned that specific proposals for a possible exchange of territory should be formulated in such a manner that the Soviets could not subsequently cite them as justification for the denial of U.S. access rights.⁸

⁸(1) Cable UNN, USBER to Secy State et al., 21 Dec 61. (2) Cable UNN, Secy State to BERLIN, 22 Dec 61. Both SECRET. (3) Draft, U.S. Army, Berlin, Hist Rept, 1 Apr - 30 Jun 62, pp. 71-3. SECRET (info used CONF). Gp-1.



Chapter 16


The U.S. Military Liaison Mission (U)

76. (S) Operating Procedures in the Face of Soviet Harassment

a. The Exchange of Missions. On 5 April 1947 Lieutenant General C.R. Huebner, EUCOM Deputy Commander-in-Chief, and Colonel General Malinin, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces, Germany signed an agreement on the establishment and exchange of military liaison missions between the two commands. The British and French had previously made comparable arrangements with the Soviets.

The exchange of military liaison missions was based on Article II of the Protocol on Control Machinery for Germany, which had been approved in 1944 by the European Advisory Commission and later ratified at the Potsdam Conference. The U.S. Mission to the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces, Germany was established initially at Potsdam, but as the scope of its operations expanded in later years, it established a headquarters in West Berlin and occupied family quarters in the American housing area, leaving only the operational offices at Potsdam. The Soviet Mission to EUCOM headquarters was stationed in Frankfurt.¹ The Huebner-Malinin Agreement allowed each of the two missions a staff of not more than 14 officers and enlisted men. They were to be given identical travel facilities, to include "identical permanent passes in Russian and English languages permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it was desired, over territory and roads in both zones, except places of disposition of military units,

¹(1) EUCOM Hist Div, The Second Year 1946-1947, Vol VI, OCCUPATION FORCES IN EUROPE SERIES, pp. 60-1. CONF. Gp-3. (2) USMLM Unit Hist, 1961, p. 1. In USAREUR Intel Div Coll Br files. SECRET. No Gp.



without escort or supervision."²

Initially, the U.S. Mission was to assist American agencies in their dealings with the Soviet headquarters and to check Soviet compliance with the quadripartite agreements. It was also to deal with other matters, such as graves registration, negotiating the extradition of prisoners for trial in the U.S. Zone, conducting negotiations regarding the protection of U.S. military trains from pilferage, and arranging the interzonal transfer of prisoners of war. Very soon, however, the mission was assigned another function, which proved to be even more important during the years that followed.³

b. A Source of Information. Within six months after its establishment, the U.S. Mission was able to provide information that was otherwise not readily available. Because observation was first-hand and made by qualified U.S. military personnel, the mission evaluated the information where necessary and disseminated it in the form of comments.⁴

c. Soviet Harassment. Even though U.S. Mission members were guaranteed uninhibited access to the Soviet Zone, they were subjected to numerous restrictions. Active and overt Soviet measures included the trailing and surveillance of mission personnel and vehicles, the detention of mission officers, withdrawal of or delay in the issuance of mission papers, and the creation of difficulties through the issuance of awkward or unacceptable documentation to the mission's accredited staff. Passive measures and circumstances included the creation of excessive numbers of restricted military areas, the erection of a variety of road barriers, road blocks, and check points throughout the Soviet Zone, and the scarcity of usable gasoline stations. The British and French missions were also faced, periodically, by similar conditions.

d. Allied Retaliation. In instances of serious Soviet harassment, Western Allied officials first filed official protests with the Soviet headquarters. Such protests, issued from time to time, rarely brought results, since the Soviets would either deny that the action being

²Agreement, Military Liaison Missions Accredited to the Soviet and United States Commanders-in-Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany, signed by Lt Gen Huebner and Col Gen Malinin, 5 Apr 47. UNCLAS.

³EUCOM Comd Rept, 1951, pp. 87-8. (2) A Survey of Soviet Aims, Policies, and Tactics, cited above, pp. 291, 293. Both SECRET. Gp-1.

⁴USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 136-7. SECRET. Gp-1.

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protested had occurred or assert that it concerned the East German regime, over which the Soviets had no control.

Because of the futility of protests, Western Allied officials agreed as early as 1950 that measures would have to be taken against the three Soviet-missions located in West Germany, to counter the restrictions placed against the Allied Missions in the Soviet Zone. They therefore decided to retaliate by imposing upon the Soviet missions the same restrictions as those to which their missions were subjected. Because of the desirability of maintaining missions in the Soviet Zone, the countermeasures could not be any stronger collectively than those applied by the Soviets or the East Germans. Nevertheless this type of retaliation generally proved effective; evidently the Soviets also desired to maintain their missions in West Germany.⁵

e. The Withdrawal of Passes in 1950. As originally agreed, five border crossing points between the Western and Soviet Zones of Germany were specifically designated for the entry and exit of mission members, without prior authorization. Dependents of mission members, however, required travel orders. When the EUCOM Adjutant General was about to move from Frankfurt to Heidelberg in late 1949, the Soviet Mission was notified that requests for such orders would thereafter have to be made seven days in advance, to permit processing and publication. In March 1950 the Soviet authorities protested against this change, alleging that it placed restrictions on free travel to and from the Soviet Zone. At the same time they failed to renew the expired U.S. Mission's passes, needed for travel in the Soviet Zone. The reason given was that the Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany was the only person authorized to sign new passes, and that he was on leave in Moscow. EUCOM's immediate assumption was that this action was a move to press the withdrawal of the mission, but when the Soviet general returned to East Germany in late April, new passes were issued.

No sooner had the new passes been issued, however, than the Soviets withdrew them in retaliation against EUCOM's 7-day-notice requirement for dependent travel orders, and substituted passes permitting travel between Potsdam and Berlin only. In turn, EUCOM revoked the Soviet Mission's passes permitting travel in the U.S. Zone, as of 19 May, and replaced them with passes good only for transit between the Mission's office and the residences of its members in Frankfurt. The Soviets filed a vigorous protest to this action, maintaining that EUCOM had violated the Huebner-Malinin agreement. In June, however, Soviet authorities returned the U.S. Mission's passes, whereupon EUCOM returned the Soviet

⁵EUCOM/USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1952, pp. 412-5. SECRET. Gp-1.

~~SECRET~~

passes. Following this incident, and during the Korean conflict, U.S. Mission personnel traveled freely in the Soviet Zone and even made trips between Potsdam and Berlin without passes.⁶

f. USAREUR Retaliation to Soviet Trailing. Probably the most harassing of all Soviet actions against the U.S. Mission during this period was the trailing and surveillance of the mission's personnel and vehicles. USAREUR argued that surveillance limited mission travel and was a flagrant violation of the spirit of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement. When protests brought no results, in April 1952 USAREUR decided to retaliate by trailing Soviet vehicles in the U.S. Zone. British and French officials agreed to apply similar actions, and in June Allied military police units began openly to trail all Soviet Mission vehicles traveling through their respective areas of jurisdiction. Within a short period Soviet authorities lodged a strong protest which, of course, was not accepted.

The Soviets' first formal action, other than to protest, was to approach the British for settlement. On 28 August Soviet and British officials agreed that each power would stop trailing the other nation's vehicles. A month later, a USAREUR representative was invited to Soviet headquarters to discuss the matter, but no agreement was reached. A more encouraging atmosphere pervaded a second meeting on 4 October, however, and USAREUR submitted a series of proposals on the matter shortly afterward. These proposals were that both the Soviets and U.S. headquarters stop the surveillance of mission grounds and vehicles, permit the missions free access as provided in the original agreement, and exchange maps showing the permanently restricted areas in each zone. Although USAREUR had doubted strongly that the proposals would be agreed to, the Soviets were evidently so anxious to see the overt trailing of their vehicles terminated that they accepted them in early November.

The trailing of mission personnel stopped on 19 November 1952, as agreed. Shortly afterward, however, the Soviets began using civilian sedans to trail U.S. Mission tours and continued that procedure for several months.⁷

⁶(1) EUCOM Ann Narr Rept, 1950, pp. 8-11. SECRET. Gp-1. (2) Staff Study, "Background on USMLM," undtd. In USAREUR Intel Div Coll Br File 274/6, 1238/60 USMLM Operations--Historical Documents. SECRET (info used CONF). No Gp.

⁷EUCOM/USAREUR Comd Rept, 1952, pp. 413-6. SECRET.. Gp-1.



77. (S) A Change in Soviet Policy

The harassment of U.S. Mission activities increased in early 1953. Mission personnel were trailed by civilian vehicles whenever they left the compound in Potsdam, mission privileges were curtailed, and members on routine travel were frequently detained for no apparent reasons. In March, however, Soviet surveillance activities ceased abruptly. The U.S. Mission's request for access to more gasoline stations was favorably received and acted upon in less than a month. Moreover, Soviet officials gave prompt and favorable answers to mission requests for authority to visit places within the Soviet Zone. Although detentions did occur, they were much less frequent and in most cases of short duration. In general, the Soviets became relatively cooperative; and in turn, USAREUR eased the reciprocal restrictions it had placed on the Soviet Mission.⁸

This change in Soviet policy was followed by a period of marked Soviet effort to avoid friction over the military missions. For instance, the number of protests received from the Soviets dropped; members of the U.S. Mission were permitted greater freedom of movement; the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt showed more willingness to cooperate; and the Soviet authorities adhered more closely to the mission agreements. During their travels in the Soviet Zone, U.S. Mission personnel were seldom trailed, and incidents involving detention of personnel occurred infrequently.⁹

During late 1955 and early 1956, harassment by Soviet personnel, and at times by the East Germans, became more frequent, but no serious incidents developed. Mission vehicles were followed and often stopped, for short periods, for the examination of credentials or for some similar reason; certain new areas were temporarily closed to mission tours, especially when troop movements were under way. These activities, however, were carried out in an orderly manner and were considered as routine interference.¹⁰


78. (S) Increasing East German Interference

a. (S) East German Harassment. Since its creation in 1949 the East German regime had been a source of trouble for the Western Allies occupying Berlin. Not until early 1957, however, had the Soviets permitted the East Germans

⁸ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, 1 Jan 53 - 30 Jun 54, pp. 480-2. SECRET. Gp-1.

⁹ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1955, p. 335. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹⁰ USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1956, pp. 131-2. SECRET. Gp-1.



to become involved, to any great extent, in the Allied military missions. Beginning in April of that year, U.S. Mission vehicles were trailed constantly by East German security agents. Frequently two or three East German vehicles were used to keep the mission tours under constant surveillance. On several occasions mission personnel were stopped, threatened, and even attacked by East German agents. When USAREUR protested that Soviet Mission personnel at Frankfurt were not subjected to this kind of treatment by West German security agents, the Soviets did not reply.

In April 1957 the U.S. Mission was rebuffed when it attempted to make arrangements for U.S. access to sections of the Soviet Zone for the purpose of continued "war dead recovery" efforts. The Soviets, in a step that was tantamount to making another attempt to achieve recognition of the East German regime, replied that the United States would have to approach the German Democratic Republic on the subject.


In spite of protests, East German harassment continued, and in late November USAREUR decided to take retaliatory action against the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt. On 2 December, U.S. military police began trailing Soviet Mission personnel, with instructions to continue surveillance for four days. East German harassment activities ceased on 4 December, and USAREUR therefore halted its retaliatory action. When East German surveillance was resumed on 5 December, U.S. personnel also resumed their activities. However, when U.S. trailing was suspended on 6 December as planned, the East German surveillance continued.¹¹

During 1958-1959 incidents involving detention and harassment of U.S. Mission personnel by East German agents increased. Mission tours were subjected to interference by local East German police and military officials. The tours had difficulty with the various road signs, many of which blocked main routes and which were often erected merely to trap mission personnel. The areas from which mission personnel were restricted permanently grew larger, and temporary restrictions were invoked more often. Incidents occurred frequently and involved obviously preplanned violations of immunity by authorities of the East German regime.¹²

In early 1959, after East German officials had expressed a definite desire to abolish the Allied missions in the Soviet Zone, U.S. Mission

¹¹USAREUR Ann Hist Rept, FY 1958, pp. 295-6. SECRET. Gp-1.

¹²(1) Cable MLM-260, USMLM to CINCUSAREUR, 12 Jul 59. (2) Meeting at GSFG hqs, 14 Oct 59, extract from verbatim record of C/USMLM. Both SECRET. No Gp.



personnel expressed a belief that many of the East German provocations were neither promoted nor authorized by the Soviets. Intelligence information indicated, in fact, that the Soviets were disturbed over U.S.-East German incidents and were considering the termination of the Huebner-Malinin agreement. This information, of course, discredited the idea that East German activities, with respect to the U.S. Mission, were part of an over-all Soviet attempt to force recognition of the regime. In any case, however, it was in the United States' interest to make every effort to maintain the U.S. Mission in the Soviet Zone. In addition to providing the single channel of communication between the commanders concerned, the missions could serve as a model for liaison or inspection teams that might be established to police future international agreements—as for instance, on disarmament. USAREUR also believed that the Soviet Missions in West Germany were as valuable as ever to the Soviets. This belief was evidently correct, because the Soviets gave no official indication that they desired to abolish the missions. At the same time, however, they made no effort to halt East German harassment.¹³


b. (C) The Exchange of Passes. In early 1960 Soviet authorities requested that all U.S. Mission passes be turned in for new ones. Although the then-current passes were valid until 15 February, the U.S. Mission exchanged six documents on 29 January. The new passes carried a Soviet signature, but made no other reference to either the "Soviet Zone" or the Soviet Union. Instead, the passes had been registered with the "German Democratic Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs." They authorized travel within the "German Democratic Republic" and bore an East German stamp.¹⁴ Since to accept them might be tantamount to recognizing the East German regime, the U.S. Mission asked USAREUR for instructions before proceeding with the exchange of the remaining passes. The British and French missions also suspended the turn-in of their old passes pending the receipt of instructions. (About one-third of the British and half of the French passes had already been exchanged.)¹⁵

The problem became acute during the afternoon of 30 January when the Soviet forces notified the three missions that the old passes would

¹³(1) DF, USAREUR JofS to G2, 24 Apr 59, subj: Retention of Allied Military Missions Accredited to Soviet Forces, East Germany. AEAGB. (2) Ltr, USAREUR to DA, 27 Apr 59, subj: Retention of West Military Missions. Both in USAREUR Intel Div Coll Br files. Both SECRET. No Gp.

¹⁴Cable MLM-010-60, USMLM to CINCUSAREUR; CINCUSAFE, 29 Jan 60. CONF. No Gp.

¹⁵Cable MLM-012-60, same to same, 30 Jan 60. CONF. No Gp.



become invalid at midnight. The Chief of the U.S. Mission picked up the other new passes that evening, but kept the old ones, which he intended to use until USAREUR instructions were received.¹⁶

c. (S) Allied Viewpoints. (S) An immediate analysis of the situation showed that the continuation of U.S. Mission activities remained a vital necessity¹⁷. To insure that the U.S. position would not be prejudiced before a decision on passes was reached, however, the U.S. Mission suspended the use of the new passes. This meant, in effect, that two officers and five enlisted men were confined to the U.S. Mission grounds at Potsdam.¹⁸ The French took similar action, but the British used the new passes for duty officers and for courier runs between Berlin and Potsdam.

(C) Meanwhile, the French Forces had taken retaliatory action immediately. On 1 February they had restricted the Soviet Mission accredited to their headquarters to the city limits of Baden-Baden, pending further instructions from Paris.¹⁹

(C) The British approached the problem from a different viewpoint. Whereas the French believed the only issue was whether acceptance of the passes could be interpreted as de facto recognition of the East German regime, the British considered the military missions to be of such value that they were unwilling to jeopardize the existence of the missions over the pass issue. Both powers, however, agreed with the United States that a protest against the new passes and a demand for a return to the old forms should be filed with a top-level Soviet authority. If the passes had to be accepted, the Western Allies would send a protest indicating that such acceptance in no way changed their attitude toward the East German regime.²⁰

¹⁶Cable MLM-013-60, same to same, 30 Jan 60. CONF. No Gp.

¹⁷Cable UNN, Dept of State to AMEMB, Bonn et al., 5 Feb 60. SECRET.

¹⁸(1) Cable MLM-015-60, USMIM to CINCUSAREUR, 4 Feb 60. CONF.
(2) Cable 71, USMIM to AMEMB, Bonn et al., 4 Feb 60. SECRET. No Gp.

¹⁹Cable MLM-014-60, USMIM to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Feb 60. CONF. No Gp.

²⁰(1) Cable 172, AMEMB, Bonn, to Dept of State, 2 Feb 60. (2) Cable UNN, AMEMB, London to Dept of State, 2 Feb 60. Both CONF.

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d. (S) The Preparation of a Protest. By 5 February USAREUR had prepared a strongly-worded draft protest letter demanding the withdrawal of the new passes.²¹ The French approved the draft as it stood, but the British opposed it because they believed that the letter's harsh demands would give the Soviets no alternative to expelling the Western military missions from the Soviet Zone. Moreover, the British argued that until the new passes were submitted to a practical test their effect could not be judged. They might well prove to be advantageous to the missions.²²


The Chief of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission supported the British view in that he considered the tone of the draft letter to be unnecessarily abrupt and liable to make the Russians refuse the demands it contained. The U.S. Departments of State and Defense believed that the Soviet move was a deliberate political gambit, with the Soviets trying to test Western reactions to a possible turnover of some of their responsibilities to the East German authorities. Thus the Allies had an excellent opportunity to demonstrate firmness, because in this clear-cut issue they could object to East German interference in their relations with the Soviets without the risk of precipitating a major crisis. If the Soviets could not be brought to terms, it might become necessary to close the missions--a regrettable solution, because of their admitted value, but a lesser evil than risking a political error that could endanger the entire Western position. The State Department therefore suggested that the three Western Allied commanders-in-chief send simultaneous letters of protest which, though based on the draft letter, were to omit some of the phraseology that was considered objectionable. The letters would demand that the old passes be reinstated and would make it clear that the Western Allies were not willing to enter into lengthy negotiations on a new pass form. If the Soviets rejected the letters of protest, the Soviet Mission personnel in Western Germany might be restricted, in retaliation.²³

During the following week the Western Allies attempted to arrive at a mutually acceptable text for the letter. They finally agreed to use the U.S.-sponsored draft, except for one paragraph that the British rephrased. The three protest letters were delivered to the Soviet

²¹ Cable UNN, Dept of State to AMEMB, Bonn et al., 5 Feb 60. SECRET.

²² (1) Cable 175, AMEMB, Bonn to Dept of State, 6 Feb 60. (2) Cable MLM-018-60, USMLM to CINCUSAREUR, 6 Feb 60. No Gp. Both SECRET.

²³ Cable UNN, Dept of State to AMEMB, Bonn et al., 11 Feb 60. SECRET.



commander on the morning of 19 February.²⁴

e. (S) Restricting the Soviet Missions. USAREUR proposed to restrict the movements of the Soviet Mission in Frankfurt, effective 11 March, unless a satisfactory reply was received by that time. However, the British were again reluctant and requested that the deadline be extended to 14 March. The French had already restricted the Soviet Mission accredited to its headquarters, and therefore supported the imposition of restrictions by the earlier date.²⁵

On 11 March USAREUR restricted the Soviet Mission to Frankfurt, to the strip of the Autobahn connecting Frankfurt with Heidelberg, and to the Herleshausen border-crossing point. The British imposed similar restrictions in their zone of responsibility the same day.²⁶ Three days later the three Western mission chiefs were summoned to Soviet headquarters, where they were informed that, for the time being, the old passes would be reissued "in order to clear the atmosphere . . . in view of the forthcoming summit conference." All new passes were turned in, the old ones were picked up, and the U.S. Mission began touring activities immediately.²⁷

f. (S) Point and Counterpoint. During the following weeks the Allied missions were subjected to continuous harassment by the East German regime. By June it became evident that the provisions of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement were either being ignored by the Soviets or becoming more difficult to comply with because the authority of the East German regime had been increased.²⁸

After serious incidents on 9 and 21 June, when Allied Mission personnel were struck and threatened with revolvers, the chiefs of all

²⁴(1) Cables 193 and 194, AMEMB, Bonn to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Feb 60.
(2) Cable 206, AMEMB, Bonn to Dept of State, 25 Feb 60. Both SECRET.

²⁵Cable 211, AMEMB, Bonn to Secy State, 7 Mar 60. SECRET.

²⁶(1) Cable SC-21814, CINCUSAREUR to Seventh Army et al., 11 Mar 60. UNCLAS. (2) Cables 219 and 220, AMEMB, Bonn to Secy State, 11 Mar 60. SECRET.

²⁷Cable MLM-049-60, USMIM to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Mar 60. CONF. No Gp.

²⁸Cable MLM-099-60, USMIM to CINCUSAREUR; CINCUSAFE, 22 Jun 60. SECRET. No Gp.

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three Western liaison missions reaffirmed their determination to continue normal touring despite harassing actions. Thus they would not only accomplish their mission but would also show the Communists that they were not willing to yield to intimidation.²⁹ On 30 June CINCUSAREUR protested against the violations of the Huebner-Malinin Agreement in a letter to his Soviet counterpart. He stated that because of their close time relationship, the recent incidents were obviously premeditated and deliberate. Though the Soviets replied, the protest brought no direct results. In retaliation, in late August USAREUR military policemen detained the Soviet Mission chief in Stuttgart for almost 10 hours. On 3 September, a representative of the Soviet headquarters offered a verbal apology for the 9 June incident and suggested to the U.S. Mission chief, "Now, let's quit."

Before the end of the year, however, other detentions occurred—one involving the chief of the U.S. Mission. These incidents seemed to indicate that the harassment of the U.S. Mission would be resumed whenever the Soviets considered this type of action as opportune.³⁰

g. (S) The Pattern Continues. In 1961, surveillance of U.S. Mission tours was continued, principally by the East German police, who followed or pursued U.S. tours "with Soviet approval." On several occasions either East German police or military officials harassed mission personnel by brandishing loaded weapons, and in one instance a tour officer and an East German policeman exchanged blows.

In many instances when local East German personnel exceeded their authority in their relations with the U.S. Mission, the Soviets seemed to play the role of referee, and U.S. protests drew little reaction. Intense surveillance was similar to that experienced in 1960, except that it was invoked for shorter periods of time and characterized by the determined pursuit of all U.S. Mission vehicles in the Soviet Zone by armed, uniformed East German security agents, operating new sedans manufactured in West Germany. The old system of harassment was supplemented by a new tactic, that of halting U.S. Mission tours for an announced period of time—one or two hours—under the guise of summary punishment for alleged violations of traffic laws.

²⁹(1) Ibid. (2) Cable MLM-100-60, same to same, 23 Jun 60. Both SECRET. No Gp.

³⁰(1) Cable SC-52959, CINCUSAREUR to DA, 22 Aug 60. UNCLAS. (2) USAREUR Ann Hist, 1960, pp. 52-3. TS (info used SECRET). Gp-1.

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Surveillance was intensified from 1 to 7 January and from 20 November to 10 December. East German harassment was suspended after the first period, presumably because of a serious incident during which an East German agent actually fired at a mission vehicle; and it was halted after the latter period as a direct result of USAREUR's retaliatory trailing of Soviet Mission personnel in West Germany. During the interim the East Germans were trailing U.S. Mission vehicles on a reduced scale, especially when temporary restrictions were in effect for certain areas of the Soviet Zone.

In those instances where actual detentions occurred, the U.S. Mission adopted a procedure whereby tour personnel would refuse to acknowledge the authority of the East German regime and would demand to see a Soviet officer. If a Soviet representative had not appeared within a reasonable length of time, the mission personnel would again protest their illegal detention and would set a time for their departure. Except on one occasion, when an East German fired on a tour vehicle, no attempts were made to prevent the tour from proceeding.

h. (S) Increase in Restricted Areas. In addition to the problems posed by East German harassment, the U.S. Mission was faced with other restrictive measures applied by the Soviets themselves. Since 1951 both the U.S. and Soviet Forces had designated certain areas in their respective zones as "permanently restricted," thereby denying major training areas, troop installations, and depots to mission personnel. In February 1961 Soviet headquarters changed its map of permanently restricted areas, and after adding amendments in August and December succeeded in denying approximately one-third of the Soviet Zone to Allied mission tours. In addition, the Soviets applied temporary restrictions during 10 different periods in 1961 to cover maneuvers and exercises, as compared to nine such restrictions applied by USAREUR in the U.S. area of responsibility.

During late 1961 and early 1962 the Soviets made an extensive practice of using mission restriction signs to place further limitations on the access of the Allied military liaison missions to major and secondary routes in their zone. By early 1962 over 1,200 of these signs had been posted and approximately 59 percent of East Germany had been permanently "closed" to Allied mission personnel, including 48 percent of all military installations and 17 of 23 major training areas. Permanent restrictions applied by the Allies covered only 22 percent of West Germany.³¹

³¹(1) USMLM Unit Hist, 1961, cited above, pp. 4-7. SECRET. No Gp. (2) Cable AEACA-AC-643, C/AC Frankfurt to CINCUSAREUR, 24 Feb 61. (3) Cable MLM-065-61, USMLM to CINCUSAREUR; CINCUSAFE, 4 Jul 61. Both CONF. No Gp. (4) Visit of CINCUSAREUR to CINC GSFG, 21 Jun 62, cited above. SECRET. Gp-3.

PART IV - CHRONOLOGY

1943

Event

- 18 - 30 October Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers reaches agreement in principle on the joint occupation of Germany and the establishment of the European Advisory Commission (EAC) to help draw up plans for the occupation of postwar Germany.
- 15 December The European Advisory Commission, consisting of representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, holds its first meeting in London.

1944

- 11 - 16 September President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, meeting at Quebec, agree to the allotment of zones of occupation in Germany to the United States and Great Britain, as approved by the European Advisory Commission on 12 September.
- 14 November The European Advisory Commission assigns occupation areas to the three great powers and approves control machinery for Germany.

1945

Event

3 - 11 February

Yalta conferees ratify the European Advisory Commission agreements of 12 September and 14 November 1944 and agree that France be assigned an occupation zone in Germany and membership on the Allied Control Council.

18 April

The Office of the Deputy Military Governor (Germany) is established. Lt Gen Lucius D. Clay is designated as Deputy Military Governor, representing the Commanding General on the Coordinating Committee of the Allied Control Council.

21 April

Soviet troops reach Berlin.

1 May

The European Advisory Commission amends its "Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany" to permit French participation in the occupation.

2 May

German troops in Berlin capitulate.

7 May

Germany signs unconditional surrender.

8 May

V-E Day; Germany's surrender becomes effective.

17 May

Soviets establish the first Berlin magistrate.

21 May

Berlin District is organized as an area command for the U.S. Sector of Berlin and its commanding general is named as the U.S. member of the Kommandatura.

5 June

Four-power Berlin Declaration announces assumption of supreme authority in occupied Germany. The quadripartite Allied Control Council is formed.

14 June

President Truman writes to Marshal Stalin on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Soviet Zone and on free access to Berlin.

16 June

The Combined Headquarters, Berlin District, is separated into national elements, and the U.S. element is redesignated as U.S. Headquarters, Berlin District.



1945

Event

18 June	Marshal Stalin, replying to President Truman, promises to take all necessary measures concerning access to Berlin.
29 June	American, British, and Soviet representatives make arrangements for the Allied use of specific roads, rail lines, and air corridors to Berlin.
1 July	Advance party of American and British troops enters Berlin. The European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA) is redesignated as U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET), with main headquarters at Frankfurt and rear headquarters at Paris.
4 July	U.S. forces occupy Berlin sector; the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Soviet Zone is completed.
7 July	Allied <u>Kommandatura</u> is formally organized.
11 July	Allied <u>Kommandatura</u> holds its first meeting and agrees that all ordinances previously issued by the Soviets remain in effect.
14 July	Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), is dissolved.
26 July	The European Advisory Commission defines the boundaries of the French Zone of Germany.
27 July	Procedures authorizing U.S. military personnel on official business to enter Soviet Zone are drafted. The first U.S. military train travels to Berlin through the Soviet Zone by way of Helmstedt and Magdeburg.
30 July	The Allied Control Council holds its first meeting in Berlin; the French are allotted a sector in Berlin.
2 August	Potsdam Conference, which had started on 17 July, ends with publication of agreement.



1945

Event

3 August

The Council of Foreign Ministers, replacing the European Advisory Commission, is created under the Potsdam Agreement.

8 August

French troops move into appointed sector in Berlin.

12 August

French take over administration of their Berlin sector.

16 August

French Commandant is seated as voting member of the Kommandatura.

10 September

Quadripartite Agreement CONL/P(45)27, governing rail transportation to Berlin, is published.

1 October

The U.S. Group, Control Council is redesignated as the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) (OMGUS).

30 November

Allied Control Council agrees that three corridors be established for air travel between Berlin and West Germany and that flights along these corridors may proceed without advance notice.

1946

3 January

U.S. authorities close Autobahn to U.S. vehicles and personnel from 1800 to 0600 with certain exceptions.

7 February

After Soviet authorities refuse to agree to quadripartite administration of Radio Berlin, located in the Soviet Sector, a radio station (RIAS) is established in the U.S. Sector to broadcast to American and British personnel.

26 March

A four-power agreement on reparations is signed, setting a maximum level of German industry and allocating reparations to the Soviet Union from the industrial surplus.


1946Event

26 May

Reparations deliveries from the U.S. Zone are halted in an effort to force all four occupying powers to agree to put into effect the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement providing for administration of Germany as an economic unit.

5 August

U.S. and U.S.S.R. agree on border crossing procedures for U.S. military personnel.

4 September

RIAS-Berlin begins broadcasting.

6 September

Secretary of State Byrnes, in a speech at Stuttgart, outlines the new American policy toward Germany.

13 September

International Facilities Bureau is established in Berlin.

20 October

City assembly elections are held throughout Berlin; of 130 seats at stake the Communists take only 29.

1947

1 January

The agreement for economic unification of the American and British Zones becomes effective with the creation of Bizonia.

15 March

USFE is redesignated as the European Command (EUCOM) and sweeping changes are made in theater organization.

5 April

General C. R. Huebner, Deputy CINCEUR, and Colonel General Malinin, Deputy CINC GSOF, sign articles of agreement on the exchange of military liaison missions.

7 April

The U.S. Military Liaison Mission (USMLM) to the Commander-in-Chief, Group of the Soviet Occupation Forces, Germany, is established at Potsdam.

10 March -
24 April

The Council of Foreign Ministers fails to agree on a German peace treaty.

1947

Event

24 June

Headquarters, EUCOM (Berlin) is redesignated as Office of the Commander in Chief, Berlin.

Ernst Reuter is elected as mayor of Berlin; the Soviet Union vetoes his election.

25 November -
15 December

Council of Foreign Ministers fails to agree on Austrian and German peace treaties.

1948

January

Guards are placed on U.S. military trains to prevent entry of Soviet inspectors.

23 February

Western Allies and the Benelux countries agree on creation of separate German government in West Germany.

20 March

The Soviet representatives leave the Allied Control Council, marking the end of quadripartite control in Germany.

28 March

Soviets request discontinuance of Allied aid and repair stations on the Autobahn.

31 March

A partial Soviet blockade of the Western sectors of Berlin begins.

Soviets issue new regulations subjecting Allied military passenger trains to a baggage and passenger check; Western Allies refuse to comply.

1 April

Soviet Kommandatura decrees that no freight can leave Berlin by rail without its permission.

Soviets begin Berlin blockade by refusing to permit American and British supply trains to pass through Soviet Zone of Germany. United States starts airlift to Berlin.

1948

Event

3 April The Act initiating the European Recovery Program is signed.

Soviet officials restrict traffic further by closing freight routes from Bavaria and Hamburg and requiring all Berlin-bound freight to be dispatched via Helmstedt.

9 April Soviets require special clearance for all freight trains leaving Berlin for the West, and impose new restrictions on parcel post service.

13 April Soviets merge the East Berlin police force with the police units of their zone.

20 April Soviets require individual clearance for all barge traffic to and from West Berlin.

1 May Berlin District is redesignated as Berlin Military Post.

1 June Representatives of Western Allies and Benelux countries recommend the convening of a constituent assembly for Western Germany.

12 June Traffic over the Elbe River bridge on the Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn is banned.

16 June The Soviet delegation withdraws from the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin.

18 June Western Allies introduce the Deutsche Mark in West Germany.

19 June Soviets stop all rail passenger and highway traffic to and from West Berlin, and also impose new freight restrictions.

21 June U.S. begins supply of Berlin Military Post by air.

23 June Western Allies introduce the Deutsche Mark in West Berlin.

1948

Event

23 June Soviets put complete stop to freight traffic, suspend mail and parcel post service, and interrupt electric power deliveries from East to West Berlin. First of a series of communist-inspired riots occurs in the Berlin city assembly.

24 June Soviets impose total blockade.

26 June Western Allies begin the Berlin Airlift.

1 July Minister presidents of 11 states of the western zones are authorized to convene an assembly to draft West German constitution.

23 August Communists riot in Berlin city assembly.

19 October East Berlin police establish road blocks around Western sectors.

30 November Communist demonstrators break up Berlin city council in East Berlin.

3 December Soviet authorities recognize newly-formed East Berlin magistrate.

1949

6 April A U.S. Army Airlift Support Command is created to assume responsibility for all operations in direct support of the Airlift Task Force at the Rhein/Main and Wiesbaden Air Force Bases.

4 May The United States, United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union agree, at New York, to remove all blockade restrictions.

11 May Tactical troops and military posts are assigned to U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR).



1949

Event

12 May	The Soviet blockade of Berlin is terminated.
20 June	Four-Power Agreement on access to Berlin is signed.
14 August	First free general elections in post-World War II period are held in West Germany.
20 August	The U.S. Army Airlift Support Command is discontinued.
24 August	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is formed.
1 September	The Office of U.S. Commander, Berlin (USCOB) is created.
21 September	The German Federal Republic is established; the Occupation Statute and the Charter of the High Commission become effective. The Office of the U.S. High Commission for Germany (HICOG) replaces the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) (OMGUS).
23 September	President Harry S. Truman announces that the Soviet Union has exploded an atomic bomb; U.S. atomic monopoly ends.
30 September	The Berlin Airlift is ended.
1 October	Food rationing in West Berlin ends.
7 October	U.S.S.R. announces the creation of the so-called German Democratic Republic (GDR).
10 October	Allied High Commission declares that Soviet zone government (German Democratic Republic) is not authorized to represent either East Germany or all of Germany.
18 November	Soviet Military Liaison Mission at Frankfurt is notified that request for travel orders for dependents of Soviet Mission members will have to be made at least seven days in advance, because the issuing unit is moving from Frankfurt to Heidelberg.



1950

Event

27 January East Germans announce that all Western non-military traffic into or through the Soviet zone or the Soviet sector of Berlin is subject to special permits from GDR police.

1 February Soviet authorities transfer supervision of East-West boundaries in Germany to GDR police.

3 February Western Allies form an interim tripartite planning committee known as the Allied Liaison Officers Standing Committee. This committee later becomes the Allied Liaison Committee, and is finally designated as the Allied Staff, Berlin.

7 March Soviets protest against EUCOM requirement that their military liaison mission personnel request dependent travel orders at least seven days in advance.

12 May Soviets withdraw U.S. Military Liaison Mission passes in retaliation against EUCOM's advance notification requirements.

19 May EUCOM revokes Soviet Military Liaison Mission passes and restricts mission travel to Frankfurt streets between residences and office.

27 - 30 May The so-called Free German Youth organization holds Deutschlandtreffen, a Whitsuntide Rally, in Berlin under the auspices of the Soviet-dominated German Democratic Republic.

19 June Soviets reissue permanent passes to the U.S. Military Liaison Mission and operations resume.

19 September The Council of Foreign Ministers declares that the Western Allies will treat any attack upon the Federal Republic of Germany or upon West Berlin as an attack upon themselves. It also announces that the Allied forces in Germany will be augmented.

21 September Soviets cut off electric power supply to West Berlin; a power plant built in West Berlin from Marshall Plan funds assumes the supply load for the three Western sectors.



1950

Event

1 October The constitution of West Berlin enters into force.
24 November U.S. Seventh Army is activated.

1951

24 January CIX TRINITY, first of 8 command post exercises, is held in West Berlin to test the Allied Staff, the staffs of the British, French, and United States forces, the West sector police, and intra- and intersector operations and communications.

12 February U.S. establishes free message service for railway passengers using U.S. military trains to and from Berlin.

23 February McNair Barracks underground ammunition storage construction project is completed.

Evacuation Plan OVERLAND is drafted.

Non-tactical demolition plan is developed.

18 March GMR police fire upon four sightseeing buses at Potsdamer Platz.

23 April Berlin alert plans are revised and republished in preparation for May Day and August Youth Festival.

27 May Special Service tours to Potsdam are discontinued.

28 May Unilateral airlift plan--Annex 3, EUCOM Support Plan to Alternate Operations Plan for a Berlin Airlift (Reduced)--is published.

5 - 19 August A Soviet-sponsored World Youth Festival is held in the Soviet sector of Berlin. The U.S. garrison is alerted on 12 August during an anti-rearmament parade, and three days later three communist-inspired riots occur--2 in the U.S. sector, 1 in the French sector--with several thousand youths participating.

1951

Event

1 September Climaxing a series of "nuisance" restrictions on communications and other services, Soviet officials impose a heavy road tax on all West Berlin vehicles using Soviet Zone streets and highways.

3 October Approximately 3,000 persons hold a communist demonstration in the French sector.

18 October GDR police occupy Steinstuecken exclave.

23 October GDR police withdraw from Steinstuecken.

24 October West Berlin police patrol is dispatched to Steinstuecken.

28 October West Berlin police patrol is withdrawn from Steinstuecken, when Soviets prevent relief patrol from entering.

1952

24 April 5,000 Communist demonstrators penetrate the French sector.

1 May 4,500 Communists demonstrate in the French sector.

8 May Soviets bar westbound U.S. and British military police highway patrols from Berlin-Helmstedt Autobahn.

13 May Soviets refuse Autobahn passage to eastbound military police highway patrols.

15 May Restrictions on Autobahn passage are lifted.

20 May Berlin non-tactical demolition plan is revised and published.

26 May Contractual Agreements are signed by representatives of the Western Allies and the Federal Republic of Germany.

1952

Event

26 May The East German Government issues an ordinance on "measures along the demarcation line between the GDR and the Western Occupation zones," closing a number of crossing points between West Berlin and the Soviet Zone and Sector.

27 May GDR authorities announce the complete closing-down of the zonal and sector borders, effective 1 June.

East Berlin authorities stop telephone communications between East and West Berlin.

British and U.S. military police highway patrols are again refused passage on Autobahn.

1 June Soviet troops and GDR police begin to seal off West Berlin sector and zonal borders.

10 June Soviets impose permanent restriction on passage of U.S. and British military police highway patrols on the Autobahn.

27 June Allied military police units begin to trail vehicles of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission in West Germany in retaliation for similar Soviet tactics in the Soviet zone.

June GDR authorities deny West Berliners the right of access to areas outside the city limits.

1 August Headquarters, U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is established in Frankfurt; the former European Command (EUCOM) is redesignated as U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), with headquarters in Heidelberg.

8 August USAREUR proposes to the Soviets that trailing of military mission vehicles be ended in both zones of Germany.

15 August Two Soviet officers, leading 60 armed soldiers, search unoccupied buildings on the grounds of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Potsdam and ignore orders to leave, but depart 15 minutes after arriving.



1952

Events

28 August Soviet and British authorities agree to stop trailing each other's military liaison mission vehicles.

8 October Soviet MIG's fire at an American plane in the Frankfurt-Berlin air corridor.

10 November Soviets accept the USAREUR proposal to stop the trailing of military mission vehicles.

19 November USAREUR halts all trailing of Soviet mission vehicles.

1 December Berlin Military Post is redesignated as Berlin Command.

1953

5 March Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin dies.

17 - 26 June Uprisings occur in East Berlin and Soviet zone; Soviet border is closed for 10 days, but there is no interruption of Allied military traffic.

1 August A tripartite proposal to plan for a daily 4,000 ton Berlin airlift is made.

26 August Allied High Commissioners protest to Soviets against restrictions of access.

3 November USCOB publishes "Estimate of the Military Situation in West Berlin in the Event of War."

20 November Exercise FAIR TRIAL is conducted at the Olympic Stadium to test Operations Instructions No. 3.

1954

25 January The National Security Council revises its policy on Berlin (NSC 5404/1).

1954

Event

3 March Exercise similar to FAIR TRIAL is held at Tempelhof Air Base; this exercise and subsequent studies lead to revision of Operations Instructions 3.

26 March Soviets proclaim the GDR to be a sovereign state; their troops remain to maintain security.

29 April A Soviet officer warns U.S. convoy commander that halts on the Autobahn are not permitted.

30 June GDR police set up check points at both ends of the lane leading to Steinstuecken and insist that all persons entering the exclave show passes.

27 September Operations Instructions No. 5 is published.

23 October Bonn Conventions are signed.

27 October USAREUR, USAFE, and HICOG establish procedures for answering Soviet protests against alleged U.S. violations in the Berlin air corridors.

29 December USCINCEUR assumes over-all Berlin planning responsibility.

1955

1 May GDR imposes a road tax on truck and passenger vehicles, not registered in Soviet Zone, traveling between Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin.

5 May Federal Republic of Germany becomes "sovereign" state. American, British, and French forces in Germany end occupation statute, but occupation of Berlin continues.

Federal Republic of Germany joins NATO.

14 May U.S.S.R. and European satellites, including East German regime, sign the Warsaw Pact; U.S.S.R. retains armies and bases in all signatory countries.



1955

Event

- 20 May Allied High Commissioners meet with Soviet counterpart to reduce Autobahn tolls imposed by East Germans.
- 7 June All road signs in English are removed from Helmstedt-Berlin Autobahn.
- 20 September U.S.S.R. grants East German regime sovereignty, but reserves right to control Western Allied land, sea, and air access to Berlin.

1956

- 7 May Western Allied Commandants in Berlin base defense plans on a new concept.
- 15 May The Allied Staff issues "rules for opening fire" to civilian and military police in West Berlin.
- 17 September Operations Instructions No. 6 is published.
- 5 November Soviet authorities at rail check point protest against presence of unauthorized passengers on Allied military trains and threaten to board trains to check passengers.
- 22 November Tripartite agreement is reached to limit Berlin travel to military and official civilian personnel.
- 29 November Soviet officials at check point hold up a convoy of U.S. military vehicles returning to Berlin and demand to inspect interior. Search is not permitted, and convoy is eventually allowed to proceed.
- 5 December A U.S. military convoy returns to Berlin rather than submit to inspection. It is permitted to pass the next day after collective show of identity documents.
- 8 - 9 December Soviets delay U.S. Ambassador's special train at check point and retain Russian translations of travel orders of four passengers, including those of Ambassador.



1956

Event

9 December

CINCUSAREUR orders military convoys on Autobahn to be discontinued.

11 December

U.S. Military Liaison Mission to the Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany is redesignated as U.S. Army Element, United States Military Liaison Mission to the Commander-in-Chief, Group of Soviet Forces, Germany.

1957

7 January

U.S.S.R. and GDR sign agreement extending stationing of Soviet troops in East Germany. A joint Soviet-GDR declaration also stipulates the "temporary" nature of the Berlin Air Corridor Agreement.

7 February

BP 104 is published.

29 March

Four-power agreement on travel documentation and forms for Allied military rail and highway traffic is signed.

April

GDR security agents trail U.S. Military Liaison Mission vehicles.

7 August

Approximately 800 GDR police surround and enter the exclave of Steinstuecken and seize a political refugee.

17 September

Soviets remove mail car from a U.S. military passenger train.

13 October

GDR institutes currency reform.

16 October

Soviets detain Bundespost cars attached to the daily U.S. parcel-post train.

25 October

Soviet BASC controller tries to file a flight plan for GDR aircraft. US BASC controller rejects plan unless rule for clearing non-four-power craft is followed. Soviet controller declares flight will take place, with his country assuming responsibility.



1957

Event

December

EP 104 is revised.

2 December

U.S. military police begin 4-day trailing of Soviet Mission personnel, in retaliation for GDR surveillance harassments against the U.S. Military Liaison Mission.

New travel documentation is used for first time.

4 December

GDR trailing ceases and USAREUR halts its surveillance.

5 December

GDR surveillance is resumed, and USAREUR resumes trailing.

6 December

USAREUR halts trailing, as planned.

11 December

GDR introduces new passport law.

28 December

GDR imposes visa requirement for Allied diplomatic travel outside Berlin, except along military access routes to the Federal Republic.

1958

10 February

Soviets introduce new procedure of stamping travel orders.

1 May

Canal tax is imposed on West German traffic to Berlin.

7 May

JCS 1907/154, providing broad policy guidance for defense of Berlin, is published.

21 May

Operation NIGHT LIGHT, USAREUR's plan to increase intelligence activities in the event of a Berlin emergency, is published.

27 May

General H. I. Hodes, CINCUSAREUR, discusses check point procedures with General Zakharov, his Soviet counterpart.

1958

Event

18 June Soviet representatives renege on Hodes-Zakharov check point conversation.

20 June First instance of advance notification in writing occurs.

23 June A U.S. convoy is forced to return to point of origin.

30 June New military truck documentation is proposed to Soviets.

1 August The Soviets refuse to allow U.S. military trucks to use the Autobahn without new documentation. Arrangements are made with the British—who are using the new documentation—to handle disabled vehicles of U.S. personnel on the Autobahn.

7 August GDR police enter Steinstuecken to arrest a fugitive.

18 August New Allied truck documentation is introduced.

3 October USAREUR EP 103 is revised.

8 October Soviets' demand to inspect interior of a U.S. military vehicle is refused; after 6-hour detention, truck returns to Berlin.

10 November Premier Nikita Khrushchev announces that Soviet functions in Berlin will be turned over to the East Germans and calls for the end of Allied occupation of West Berlin.

12 November In commenting on Premier Khrushchev's speech, GDR Premier Grotewohl mentions a "possible" Soviet troop withdrawal from East Berlin as a whole—a statement that is later modified by adding "in the event of a similar Western withdrawal."

14 November A convoy of three vehicles is detained for approximately six hours at the Soviet check point because the convoy commander refuses inspection of the cargo. The convoy returns to West Berlin.

1958

Event

27 November

A Soviet note, delivered to the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the GDR, declares that the Four-Power agreements concerning the status of Berlin are "null and void"; recommends liquidation of that status within six months; proposes the establishment of a "demilitarized free city" status, "for the time being," for West Berlin; and states that, in any case, all remaining Soviet occupation functions will be handed over to the GDR government at the end of the 6-month period.

31 December

In identical notes, the Western Allies reject the demand for evacuation of their troops from Berlin and the proposal for creation of a free city.

1959

10 January

Soviet Union submits draft of proposed peace treaty with Germany to the Western Allies.

15 January

USAREUR issues special instructions to U.S. military train commanders.

30 January

British issue new instructions to their military train commanders.

2 February

USAREUR EP 109 is published.

A U.S. military convoy is detained for 2½ days for refusal to allow inspection of the vehicles. The vehicles are finally allowed to proceed.

6 February

Western Allies reply to Soviet peace treaty proposal by suggesting four-power conference on Germany.

27 March

The Soviets insist that air corridor flights at altitudes higher than 10,000 feet are inadmissible.



1959

Event

1 April

USAREUR authorizes Berlin Command to notify Soviet officials of operational level, for traffic control purposes only, before unusually large items of equipment, such as tanks on transporters, are to be moved on the Autobahn.

15 April

One day's advance notice is given to Soviet check point personnel, warning them of the passage of a truck and bulldozer.

11 May

Foreign Ministers conference starts at Geneva, with representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany and the East German regime present as advisers.

27 May

The Soviet deadline for signing of a separate Soviet-GDR peace treaty passes with no action.

29 May

USAREUR EP 103 is revised.

3 June

The Western Allies stipulate four general principles for the settlement of the Berlin question: maintenance of the Western Allied rights in Berlin acquired at the end of World War II; confirmation of their right to free access to the city; a quadripartite agreement that the Berlin status would not be changed unilaterally; and readiness of the West to consider certain improvements or changes in all Berlin including symbolic troop cuts, restrictions on espionage and propaganda in the entire city area, and the formation of a four-power control commission.

5 June

USAREUR EP 101 is published.

1 July

U.S. State Department approves instructions to be applicable if GDR officials replace Soviets at check points on the surface access routes.

23 July

Berlin OPLAN 1-59 is published.

5 August

At the end of the Foreign Ministers conference at Geneva, Premier Khrushchev states that there will be no change in the status of Berlin as long as negotiations are under way, but adheres to the free city plan for Berlin.



1959

Event

14 September USAREUR EP 1013 (formerly EP 107) is published.

20 September -
13 October Premier Khrushchev visits the United States at President Eisenhower's invitation and attends U.N. General Assembly in New York.

11 November Soviets protest against West German plans to build a radio station in West Berlin.

14 November Premier Khrushchev boasts of Soviet missile power and threatens the Federal Republic of Germany.

18 November Berlin Command EP 131 is published.

1 December Premier Khrushchev again threatens to sign separate peace treaty with East Germany.

1960

14 January Premier Khrushchev repeats his threat to sign a separate peace treaty.

19 January The Department of the Army authorizes the issuance of more modern weapons to Berlin Police Force "B" to improve its combat potential.

30 January Soviet authorities issue new permits to the three Allied military liaison missions in Potsdam, authorizing the holders to travel in the "German Democratic Republic." The three missions are informed that the old passes will become invalid at midnight.

1 February In retaliation for the issuance of unacceptable permits to their mission, the French restrict the Soviet Military Liaison Mission to Baden-Baden.

USCINCEUR OPLAN 200-10 is published.

1960

Event

2 - 4 February

Soviet check point personnel insist on inspecting the cargoes of four trucks, but the U.S. convoy commander refuses to give them access to the vehicles. The convoy is finally released after intervention by the U.S. Military Liaison Mission and Berlin officials and a protest from Washington.

4 February

Warsaw Pact signatories commit themselves to a separate peace treaty with East Germany.

19 February

Western Allies reject the new Soviet permits for members of their military liaison missions.

29 February

Western Allies announce that they will resume high altitude flights in the Berlin air corridors.

3 March

Western Allies postpone high altitude flights to Berlin.

11 March

In retaliation for the refusal of Soviet authorities to issue acceptable permits to the Allied military liaison missions in Potsdam, the United States and Great Britain restrict the movements of the Soviet military liaison missions attached to their headquarters.

14 March

The Soviet Union announces that it will continue to honor the old military liaison mission passes "until further notice."

15 March

The Western Allies lift restrictions imposed on the movement of Soviet military mission personnel in the Federal Republic of Germany.

25 April

Premier Khrushchev repeats threat of separate Soviet peace treaty with East Germany.

12 May

Operations FREE STYLE and JACK PINE are completed.

16 May

Premier Khrushchev disrupts Paris summit conference.

11 June

Operation TRADE WIND is completed.

31 August

GDR police stop West Germans at sector and zonal border check points.

1960

Event

- 1 September The West Berlin authorities announce that they will pay the air transportation for all West German visitors to Berlin who are stopped at border check points.
- 3 September The Western Allies denounce the illegal GDR restrictions on movement to and in Berlin.
- 5 September East Germans lift the restrictions imposed on West German movement to and in Berlin. (Of 1,061 travelers refused access at the zonal border, some 700 had accepted the free air transportation offered on 1 September.)
- 8 September East Germans impose special permits on West German residents desiring access to East Berlin. Five sector border check points are designated at which West Germans can request such permits.
- 10 September In retaliation for GDR restrictions, the Allied Travel Office in Berlin stops issuing transit visas for East German and East Berlin functionaries.
- 15 September East Germans refuse to recognize passports issued by the Federal Republic of Germany to West Berlin residents as proper travel documents for transit through the Soviet Zone, and insist that provisional West Berlin identification cards are the only acceptable papers.
- 20 September In retaliation, Western Allies rule that East Germans cannot use GDR passports for travel to foreign countries via West Germany; such passports, however, continue to be valid as identification for travel from the Soviet Zone to West Germany.
- USAREUR EP's 112 and 113 are published.
- The GDR authorities stop honoring transit passes for entry to Steinstuecken, and require West Berliners to obtain a new type of pass, by which a visit to Steinstuecken is placed in the same category as a visit to the Soviet Zone.



1960

- 22 September U.S. Ambassador W. C. Dowling, driving to East Berlin, is stopped by GDR police.
- 28 September The Soviet Embassy in East Berlin announces that, retroactive to 15 September, the Soviet Union has ceased to recognize West German passports as valid documents for West Berliners, and that West Berlin residents can obtain Soviet visas only by submitting their identification cards.
- 10 December Quadripartite airlift plan, based on HICOM P 54, is published.
- 31 December Trade agreement between Federal Republic of Germany and East German regime is renewed.

1961

- 4 February GDR agents in civilian clothing trail a USMLM tour, signal tour to halt, and fire one shot when the tour fails to heed signal.
- 5 February Soviets effect change in areas permanently restricted to the U.S. Military Liaison Mission.
- 16 February East Berlin police introduce a simplified permit for West Germans wishing to enter the Soviet sector of Berlin.
- 21 February East German mob hauls down an American flag and damages U.S. Military Liaison Mission property.
- 6 March USAREUR EP 115 (formerly EP 104) is published.
- 15 March USAREUR EP 1013 is completed.
- 30 March Seventh Army EP 115 (formerly EP 104) is published.
- 1 May Berlin Command EP 101 is published.
- 3 - 4 June President J. F. Kennedy meets Premier Khrushchev in Vienna, Austria.

1961

Event

2 July Soviet Colonel detains a U.S. Military Liaison Mission tour near a Soviet bivouac area, ridicules the U.S. Mission officer in front of Soviet troops, and confiscates his credentials.

1 August Berlin Command manual for emergency evacuation of noncombatants is revised.

2 August Western Allied Commandants protest to their Soviet counterpart against GDR discriminatory measures imposed on the many thousands of East Berlin workers employed in West Berlin.

4 August East Berlin administration decrees that workers employed in West Berlin must register and that non-compliance with this order will be punished by imprisonment and/or fines.

12 August East Germans announce that only 13 of the 120 sector border crossing points will remain open for pedestrian and vehicular traffic.

13 August In the early morning hours, GDR authorities close zonal border crossing points to all East Berliners and East Germans. By noon, East German work details begin to erect barbed wire and other obstacles along the sector border.

14 August GDR authorities interrupt telephone and teletype communications between the Soviet Zone and East Berlin, on the one hand, and Western Germany and West Berlin, on the other, and decree that no West Berlin vehicles can enter East Berlin without a special permit.

16 August Teletype communications are resumed; telephone communications remain interrupted.

17 August The Western Allies protest the blocking of the Berlin sector border and request that the Soviet Union annul these illegal measures.

20 August An entire reinforced U.S. battle group moves over the Autobahn to Berlin in one day. First dismounting of convoy personnel occurs.

1961

Event

22 August

Telephone communications are resumed.

23 August

The U.S. Commandant moves one battle group, with tanks, to certain points of the sector border. The British and French Commandants also send troops to the sector border.

A GDR attempt to check passengers in Allied military vehicles entering East Berlin is thwarted after a U.S. protest to Soviet officers.

25 August

The Allied Kommandatura forbids the opening of a GDR office in West Berlin for the issuance of special passes to West Berliners.

30 August

President Kennedy appoints General Lucius D. Clay (Ret.), one-time military governor in Germany, as his special ambassador to Berlin.

Revised instructions on procedures to be applicable if East Germans replace Soviet personnel at check points on access routes receive quadripartite approval.

2 September

East Germans build two 8-foot barbed wire fences, with concertina between the fences, around the exclave of Steinstuecken.

Soviets protest use of the Berlin air corridors by commercial aircraft.

13 September

Operations Instructions 3/61 is published.

15 September

Soviet fighters buzz two U.S. commercial airliners flying to Berlin.

16 September

A Pan-American airliner is harassed by Soviet jets on a flight from Berlin.

19 September

General Clay arrives in Berlin and takes over his new post.

21 September

General Clay flies to Steinstuecken by helicopter.

1961

Event

21 September

GDR police stop U.S. military personnel on Autobahn, take them into custody, and confine them to prison.

22 September

Three U.S. military policemen are flown to Steinstuecken by helicopter.

Autobahn patrolling by U.S. military police is resumed.

24 September

Soviets protest Autobahn patrolling.

25 September

Operations Instructions ASB 2/61 is published.

1 October

Operations Instructions 1/61 is published.

Deutsche Marks are no longer admitted as legal tender in East Berlin.

15 October

Generals Clay and Watson (USCOB) demonstratively drive into the Soviet Sector after GDR police stop U.S. vehicles and order passengers to identify themselves.

18 October

East German Army personnel detain U.S. Military Liaison Mission tour, brandish weapons, club the Mission car, and cover the car's windshield with a blanket. After several hours' detention, the tour vehicle is permitted to drive to a local Soviet headquarters.

22 October

GDR police at Friedrichstrasse check point stop U.S. automobile with civilian passengers, including Mr. F. A. Lightner, Assistant Chief, U.S. Mission Berlin, who is twice held up by GDR police. U.S. military escort then takes him through the check point.

25 October

USAREUR-licensed vehicles with drivers in civilian clothes, prevented from going through Friedrichstrasse check point, are escorted by U.S. military personnel. U.S. forces, including ten tanks and three armored reconnaissance cars, are placed at Friedrichstrasse check point from 1110 to 1805 hours.



1961

Event

26 October U.S. tanks are again deployed at Friedrichstrasse; military escorts accompany USAREUR-licensed vehicles through the check point under continued GDR harassment.

27 October U.S. armored vehicles are deployed at Friedrichstrasse; military escorts again accompany USAREUR-licensed cars, with occupants in civilian clothes, through check point. Some 33 Soviet tanks appear in East Berlin near check point.

Soviets begin to "tail" U.S. Autobahn patrols.

28 October Berlin Command Operations Plan 3-6 is published.

U.S. and Soviet tanks are withdrawn from Friedrichstrasse check point but remain in the area. U.S. authorities temporarily suspend civilian visits to East Berlin.

29 October Autobahn patrolling by U.S. military police is suspended. GDR police continue harassment of British and French vehicles and passengers at Friedrichstrasse check point.

31 October U.S. decides to stop sending military police patrols on the Autobahn.

3 November Interchange of infantry companies is initiated.

7 November USAREUR directs that all U.S. military personnel entering East Berlin wear uniforms and that dependents and civilian personnel officially connected with the U.S. Government abstain from entering East Berlin.

9 November U.S. military police at Friedrichstrasse check point take over the checking of all Soviet citizens entering and leaving West Berlin in vehicles not marked as official.

20 November U.S. Military Liaison Mission tour personnel are manhandled by East German civilian agents after tour car inadvertently bumps the surveillance vehicle. Tour vehicle drives on to local Soviet headquarters to protest.

1961

Event

20 November

The Western Allies in Berlin reinforce their military security forces at the sector border. U.S. military personnel continue visits to East Berlin.

Berlin Command Operations Plan 3-7 is published.

25 November

U.S. military train is held up for more than 15 hours until an unauthorized East German passenger is turned over to Soviet authorities.

30 November

Quadripartite instructions for procedures to be followed if East Germans take control of the check points on the access routes are again revised.

1 December

Berlin Command is redesignated as U.S. Army, Berlin. CG, U.S. Army Garrison, Berlin, is redesignated as CG, U.S. Army Berlin Brigade.

Office, United States Commander, Berlin, is redesignated as Office, United States Commander, Berlin (USCOB) and Commanding General, United States Army, Berlin (CG, USAB).

5 December

GDR personnel in uniform harass U.S. Military Liaison Mission tour vehicle.

7 December

The exchange of two U.S. battle groups via Autobahn begins.

9 December

Soviets "re-register" old U.S. Military Liaison Mission passes.

23 December

USCOB, on his way to Soviet headquarters for an official visit, is stopped at Friedrichstrasse because the civilian officials accompanying him refuse to show their identification papers to GDR police. In protest, USCOB cancels his appointment.

27 December

In retaliation, U.S. authorities in Berlin bar the Soviet Commandant and his political aide from entering the U.S. Sector.



1961


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
December


First formal U.S. advance notification in writing
submitted to Soviet check point personnel.

Map 1 (U)









COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS OF ALLIED STAFF BERLIN

(ASSUMING THAT THE U. S. COMMANDANT IS CHAIRMAN COMMANDANT DURING MONTH WITNESSING COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS)




Chart 1 (C)

SOURCE: ALLIED STAFF BERLIN, 1951



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
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